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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the problem of optimizing the U.S. Army’s Light Tactical 
Wheeled Vehicle (LTWV) fleet over the next 15 years.  To achieve these ends we created 
a multiple objective decision analysis (MODA) model which assigns a value to each 
vehicle in the LTWV fleet, as well as a linear program (LP) which allows decision 
makers to find feasible modernization strategies for the LTWV fleet subject to multiple 
constraints such as budget and operational readiness. 
The MODA assigns a value to every individual vehicle variant depending upon its 
measures of performance in several categories.  Those values are used by the LTWV LP 
to prescribe solutions for decision makers.  We implemented the LTWV LP using 
notional data and ran initial analyses to demonstrate the program’s validity.  Possible 
analyses include varying any of the LTWV LP inputs, such as operational, budgetary, and 
age requirements, as well as procurement availability bounds.  The project serves as a 
conceptual framework for future refinement of the decision tool requested by the U.S. 
Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis investigates the problem of modernizing the U.S. Army’s Light 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (LTWV) fleet over the next 15 years.  Specifically, we created 
a decision tool that seeks to find a modernization strategy that satisfies constraints such as 
budget, operational, and age requirements.  The constraints in the decision tool are 
designed to be alterable so that the user can observe the outcome effects of varying 
constraints.  Ultimately, the goal is to enable the user to gain insight into potential future 
modernization strategies for the LTWV fleet.  The U.S. Tank-Automotive and 
Armaments Command (TACOM) requested this tool to support policy makers in making 
decisions about the future of the LTWV fleet. 
The High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) currently serves 
as the Armed Forces LTWV.  The U.S. Army currently maintains an inventory of over 
100,000 HMMWVs.  The HMMWV fleet is large and versatile, fulfilling the role of 
reconnaissance, utility, combat, cargo/troop transport, and ambulance vehicles.  
However, the HMMWV is falling short of recent increased operational demands.  Two 
major problems are causing the HMMWVs’ recent shortcomings.   
The first problem is the venerability of the HMMWV fleet.  The current average 
age of the HMMWV fleet is greater than the designed lifespan of any given vehicle.  This 
rise in age causes more frequent breakdowns, disabling the vehicles from completing 
their missions and increasing Operations & Support (O&S) costs.1 
 The second problem is the HMMWV fails to meet the increased operational 
requirements placed upon it by the Army.2  Asymmetric warfare practiced by insurgents 
and terrorists places an increased responsibility on the HMMWV to serve as a robust 
combat vehicle.  The HMMWV simply lacks the performance capabilities to serve in this  
                                                 
1 Global Security.  “HMMWV Recapitalization.”; available from http://www.globalsecurity.org; 
INTERNET. 
2 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), ii. 
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dynamic combat role.  The Army sees the need to employ a new vehicle to meet the 
increased operational demands of the 21st Century.  The Army is currently designing such 
a vehicle, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). 
The Army is requiring that the JLTV perform sufficiently in every area that the 
HMMWV is falling short.  Eventually, the JLTV will replace the HMMWV and become 
the new LTWV.  The JLTV will assume every mission responsibility that the HMMWV 
currently holds, including the role of a robust combat vehicle capable of responding to 
insurgents’ style of asymmetric warfare.  The Army plans to begin integrating the JLTV 
as early as 2012, and will continue JLTV integration until every HMMWV is retired from 
service.  Because the JLTV cannot immediately be implemented, there still exists the 
problem of the ever aging HMMWV fleet.  To solve this, the Army has implemented a 
policy called the Recapitalization Program (or “recapping”) which converts aged combat 
HMMWV variants into a new more robust variant. 
Over time, as the JLTV is integrated, the LTWV fleet will be comprised of a 
mixture of HMMWVs and JLTVs.  Each year a number of HMMWVs will undergo 
“recapping” or be retired and a number of new JLTVs will be procured.  Therefore, the 
composition of the LTWV fleet will change every year.  TACOM has requested a 
decision tool that models this process in hopes of gaining insight into potential 
modernization strategies. 
Our thesis work completes the initial formulation and implementation of this 
decision tool.  Two main parts comprise the decision tool.  The first part is a multiple 
objective decision analysis (MODA), which we refer as the Value Model (VM).  The VM 
assigns a value to every HMMWV and JLTV variant based upon their performance over 
a series of competing objectives.  The second part of the decision tool is a linear program 
(LP) which optimizes the value of the LTWV fleet for the next 15 years.  The fleet value 
of any given year is determined using the current fleet inventory and the value results 
from the VM. 
The goal of the VM is to assign a value to each LTWV variant.  This value aims 
to capture a vehicle's overall operational ability.  In this model, operational ability is 
xix 
represented as achievement over several competing objectives.  We developed three main 
qualitative objectives that measure the operational ability of a vehicle.  These broad 
objectives are mobility, net-readiness, and survivability.  We drafted these objectives 
based upon vehicle capability documents and subject matter expert input.  From these 
broad objectives, we used a top-down approach to further define sixteen quantitative sub-
objectives.  We measured a vehicle's achievement by quantitative performance in each 
sub-objective.  A vehicle's value in each sub-objective is combined as a weighted sum to 
give its overall value. 
The LTWV LP is the actual decision tool.  Its constraints frame the modernization 
problem in terms of age, budgetary limitations, operational requirements, and bounds on 
the number of vehicles available for purchase.  Operational requirements are measured in 
units of value, derived from the VM.  The values from each vehicle are combined by 
objective to ensure the fleet maintains enough of each capability.  The LTWV LP is 
written elastically, such that a constraint may be violated at the price of a corresponding 
penalty.  In the LTWV LP, the penalties are set high enough that the program will only 
choose to violate a constraint if there is no feasible solution.  The objective function of 
the LTWV LP seeks to find a feasible solution to this problem by minimizing the 
penalties incurred from violated constraints.  The LTWV LP spans over 15 years, 
minimizing penalties each year.  Each year the set of constraints evolves, and each 
subsequent year uses the fleet inventory numbers from the previous year.  We collected 
data, implemented an LP developed by NPS faculty, and ran several initial analyses, 
illustrating the combined VM and LTWV LP proof of concept as a decision tool. 
 In the analysis we modeled several different scenarios by manipulating the 
constraint data that we possessed.  We varied the maximum vehicle age, the yearly 
budget, and the minimum and maximum bounds on vehicles available for purchase.  The 
most profound analysis we performed was simulating a delay in the implementation of 
the JLTV program.  The result of this analytical excursion was that a delay of two years 
significantly lowered the fleet values every year.  In eight of the 15 years simulated, the 
fleet could not maintain its starting value, dipping below its current state.  Because delays  
xx 
in programs are not uncommon, preparing a contingency plan for such a delay is a 
recommendation that we would be willing to make to TACOM.  This is just an example 
of many analyses that can be run with this decision tool. 
The decision tool we created is so adaptable for encompassing future scenarios 
that it is primed for further research.  Further related projects include running an in-depth 
analysis of modernization strategies, further developing the data collected, or reproducing 
the tool with a more user-friendly interface.  This thesis covers the conceptual framework 
necessary to formulate and implement TACOM’s decision tool.  With this framework, we 





This thesis researches the problem of the modernization of the U.S. Army’s Light 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (LTWV) fleet.  The objective of this research is to create a 
decision tool that the U.S. Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) can 
use to plan its TWV modernization strategies for the next two decades. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles are wheeled vehicles used for combat, combat support, 
and combat service support missions by every branch of the armed forces.  Perhaps the 
most recognizable TWV today is the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV).  HMMWVs fill a wide range of roles to include reconnaissance, utility, 
combat, cargo/troop transport, and ambulance.  The HMMWV is a Light Tactical 
Wheeled Vehicle (LTWV) and comprises approximately 50% of the TWV fleet.  The 
Army currently operates over 100,000 HMMWVs.  This thesis focuses on the LTWV 
portion of the greater TWV fleet. 
Currently, the LTWV fleet is aging.  The average vehicle age is 17 years. The 
fleet is also deteriorating at an accelerated rate.  This is due to its constant employment in 
combat zones and adverse environments, such as deserts.  Consequently, vehicles need 
constant service, which causes significant maintenance costs and a decrease in vehicle 
operational availability.  The vehicles no longer sufficiently fulfill their mission 
requirements.  Their constant use in operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
and the many associated Iraq pacification operations reveals major shortcomings in the 
fleet’s mobility, net-readiness and survivability.   
To meet the more demanding mission requirements of the LTWV, the Army is 
developing a newer, more robust vehicle.  The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) will 
eventually replace the HMMWV as the Army’s new LTWV.  However, two problems 
exist with the fielding of the JLTV.  First, a majority of the HMMWV fleet is past its life 
expectancy and current operations are accelerating its deterioration.  Second, the JLTV 
cannot be integrated instantly, as the vehicle is still in its design phase.  The production  
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rate of the vehicle will require several years to achieve full fielding.  Consequently, the 
LTWV fleet requires immediate attention to improve its performance to satisfy increased 
operational requirements. 
The Army is solving this problem by performing maintenance on some of the 
existing HMMWVs to increase their lifecycle, and by gradually integrating the JLTVs, 
when available.  The solution must meet the operational needs of the Army and remain 
within the allowed budget.  For instance, not all of the HMMWVs can be simultaneously 
pulled from the field to be serviced at the same time, nor can the Army spend their entire 
budget on fixing HMMWVs, as they would lack sufficient funds to procure new JLTVs. 
The Army has three options for fleet modernization: 
• Recapitalization (Recap):  Upgrade a HMMWV to a new, more robust 
variant.  This makes the vehicle unusable while in the maintenance depot. 
• Buy New:  Order a brand new HMMWV or JTLV to fill the demand for a 
particular vehicle type. 
• Retire:  Retire a HMMWV from service permanently.  A new vehicle may 
replace a retiring vehicle.  Currently, retirement rarely happens, as Army 
doctrine dictates that a vehicle should be repaired unless its repair costs 
exceed the cost to purchase a new vehicle.  Only then will a vehicle be 
retired.  As the JLTV is placed into service, a commensurate number of 
HMMWVs may be retired to reduce Operations & Support (O&S) costs. 
Over the next several years, as JLTVs are being phased in and HMMWVs are 
being retired, the LTWV fleet will be comprised of a mixture of new and old vehicles.  
Every year, budgets will need to be allocated to either fix older existing HMMWVs or to 
purchase new HMMWVs or JLTVs.  Our thesis examines modernization strategies in the 
context of meeting budgetary and operational requirements. 
It is TACOM’s responsibility to plan the future composition of the TWV fleet 
strategically, such that it meets its budgetary and operational requirements.  TACOM 
requested that a decision tool be created to offer insight into future planning.  This 
research serves as the conceptual framework for this decision tool.  The decision tool is 
3 
comprised of a multiple objective decision analysis (MODA), which we refer to as the 
Value Model (VM), and a LTWV linear program (LP) that utilizes the results of the VM 
to find feasible LTWV fleet modernization strategies.   The results will help TACOM 
with making optimal decisions during the LTWV modernization process. 
Chapter II of this thesis explores the history of the LTWV fleet.  Chapter III 
discusses the analytical techniques required to create a multiple objective decision 
analysis (MODA) for the VM and an LP.  Chapter IV covers the methodology of both the 
VM and the LTWV LP.  Chapter V is an analysis of the decision tool, illustrating its 
power and potential.  Lastly, Chapter VI summarizes our work and explores further 
research possibilities. 
4 
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A. HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE (HMMWV) 
In the 1970s the U.S. Army recognized a need to replace the aging M151 series 
vehicle.  The Vietnam War made it clear that U.S. armed forces needed a newer, more 
versatile Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV).  By 1979, the Army had settled on a design, 
and the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) was delivered to the 
fleet in 1985.  Presently, there are many different HMMWV variants, becoming the 
virtual backbone of the armed forces Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (LTWV) fleet.   
The HMMWV replaced the M151 Military Utility Tactical Truck (MUTT) (1/4-
ton), the M274 Mule (1/2-ton), the M561 Gamma Goat (1 1/4-ton), the M718A1 
Ambulance, and the M792 Ambulance.  Each replacement HMMWV variant assumed 
the mission role of the retiring vehicle.  The current mission statement of the HMMWV is 
“to provide a light tactical wheeled vehicle for command and control, troop transport, 
light cargo transport, shelter carrier, ambulance, towed weapons prime mover, and 
weapons platform throughout all areas of the battlefield or mission area.”3 
Although there are many different HMMWV variants, every HMMWV carries 
some design similarities.  The HMMWV is a highly mobile, diesel-powered, four-wheel-
drive, and air-transportable vehicle that uses a common 4,400 lb payload chassis.4  This 
allows HMMWVs to use common components, kits, and fuels.  Each variant, however, 
has unique attributes and abilities.  There are cargo/troop carrier, shelter carrier, 
armament carrier, ambulance, TOW missile carrier and scout-reconnaissance variants. 
                                                 
3 U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization.  Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD) for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).  (Fort 
Eustis, VA: GPO, 2004), 1. 





Figure 1. The M998 Series 
 
The first HMMWV, the M998, serves as the baseline vehicle for all the variants.  
The M998, M998A1, M1038 and M1038A1 HMMWVs are light utility vehicles.  They 
are equipped with basic armor and are used to transport troops and materiel.  The cargo 
carrier is capable of a payload of up to 2,500 lbs.  The troop carrier can support a two-
man crew and carry up to eight passengers.  The “A1” classification after any HMMWV 
indicates that it is a newer version of the same variant, updated with newer 
modifications.5 
 
Figure 2. The M1097 Series 
 
The M1097, M1097A1, M1097A2 are the heavy utility vehicles.  Instead of the 
2,500 lb. payload capacity of the light utility vehicles, the M1097 variants have a payload 
capacity of 4,575 lbs.  Like the other cargo/troop carriers, it can support a crew of two 
with eight passengers.  In addition to its cargo/troop carrying function, the M1097 can 
power shelter equipment.6 
                                                 
5 Federation of American Scientists (FAS).  “High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 




Figure 3. The M1025 Series 
 
The M966, M1025, M1025A1, M1026 and M1026A1 HMMWVs are light 
armament carrier configurations in the HMMWV family.  These variants are equipped 
with basic armor and a weapons mount, located on the roof of the vehicle.  The weapons 
mount is adaptable and can accommodate the M60 7.62mm machine gun, M2 .50 caliber 
machine gun, or the MK 19 grenade launcher.  The roof mount provides the weapons a 
360-degree firing radius.7 
 
Figure 4. The M1043 Series 
 
The M1043, M1043A1, M1044, and M1044A1 vehicles are heavy armament 
carrier configurations of the HMMWV family.  The only major difference between the 
M1043 variants and the M1025 variants is that the M1043 variants boast supplemental 
armor. 
 
                                                 
7 Federation of American Scientists (FAS).  “High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV) (M998 Truck).”  (2000); available from http://www.fas.org; INTERNET. 
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Figure 5. The M1037 Series 
 
The, M1037, M1042, and M1113 HMMWVs are shelter carrier configurations.  
The M1037 and the M1042 are the light shelter configurations and the M1113 is a heavy 
shelter carrier configuration, differing in vehicle weights and payload capacity.  The 
vehicles are equipped with basic armor and are used to transport the S250 shelter 
equipment.  The vehicles possess a total payload capacity (including crew) of 3,600 
pounds.8 
 
Figure 6. The M997 Series and the M1035 Series 
 
The M996, M996A1, M997, M997A1, M997A2, M1035 and M1035A2 
HMMWVs are the ambulance configurations in the HMMWV family.  These vehicles 
are equipped with basic armor and used to transport casualties from the battlefield to 
medical-aid stations.  The M996 and M996A1 are light ambulances and can 
accommodate either two litter patients, six sitting patients or a combination of the two.  
The M997, M997A1, and M997A2 are heavy ambulances and can accommodate either  
                                                 
8 Federation of American Scientists (FAS).  “High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV) (M998 Truck).”  (2000); available from http://www.fas.org; INTERNET. 
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four litter patients, eight sitting patients or a combination.  The M1035 and M1035A2 are 
soft-top ambulances.  The M1035 is a light ambulance and the M1035A2 is a heavy 
ambulance.  Each can accommodate up to two litter patients. 9 
 
Figure 7. The M1114 Series 
 
The M1109 and M1114 HMMWVs are up-armored armament carrier 
configurations in the HMMWV family.  The primary function of the up-armored 
armament carrier is to perform reconnaissance and security operations.  In addition to the 
basic armor, supplemental armor is attached to the sides and underbelly of the vehicle to 
protect occupants from small arms fire and mines.  The creation of the up-armored 
HMMWV was motivated by the need to create a vehicle that could withstand Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED) attacks more adequately.  However, these up-armored 
HMMWVs are 2,000 lbs. heavier, making them less maneuverable with a shorter cruising 
range than their lighter counterparts.10  This trade-off is costly, as their main function is 
reconnaissance, for which mobility is critical.  Like the other armament carriers, there is a 
roof weapons-mount capable of housing an M60 7.62mm machine gun, M2 .50 caliber 
machine gun, or an MK 19 grenade launcher. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Federation of American Scientists (FAS).  “High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV) (M998 Truck).”  (2000); available from http://www.fas.org; INTERNET. 
10 Global Security.  “High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).”; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org; INTERNET. 
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The M1069 HMMWV is the prime mover variant, designed to transport the 
M119, 105mm Light Howitzer.  The vehicle contains two seats and an open-air flatbed in 
the back, used to store the 105mm Howitzer ammunition. 
 A more concise reference of each HMMWV variant and its capabilities is listed 
below: 
Table 1.   HMMWV Variant/Mission/Armor Rating Table 
 
In 1995, HMMWV manufacturers introduced an “A2” configuration and the 
Expanded Capacity Vehicle (ECV).  The A2 configurations contain a four-speed 
transmission and a 6.5 liter diesel engine, which improves mobility.  The ECV variants 
handle an increased payload of up to 5,100 lbs. including their crews.  The ECV can be 
used as the chassis for the M1114, an up-armored HMMWV used for reconnaissance.  
The ECV series is also used as the platform for missions that require payloads greater 
than 4,400 lbs.11 
                                                 
11 Global Security.  “High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).”; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org; INTERNET. 
HMMWV Variant Mission Armor 
M998 Cargo/Troop carrier Basic Armor 
M1038 Cargo/Troop carrier Basic Armor 
M966 Tow Missile carrier Basic Armor 
M1036 Tow Missile carrier Basic Armor 
M1045 Tow Missile Carrier Supplemental Armor 
M1046 Tow Missile Carrier Supplemental Armor 
M1025 Armament Carrier Basic Armor 
M1026 Armament Carrier Basic Armor 
M1043 Armament Carrier Supplemental Armor 
M1044 Armament Carrier Supplemental Armor 
M996 Mini-Ambulance, 2-Litter Basic Armor 
M997 Maxi-Ambulance, 4-Litter Basic Armor 
M1035 Soft-Top Ambulance, 2-Litter Basic Armor 
M1037 Shelter Carrier Basic Armor 
M1042 Shelter Carrier Basic Armor 
M1069 Prime Mover for M119 105-mm light gun Basic Armor 
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Although the Army created the HMMWV to complete a wide range of missions, 
it has developed major weaknesses in recent years.  The HMMWV was a revolutionary 
and useful technology in the 1980s, but it is an aging platform that is currently falling 
short of its expectation.  In the Global War on Terrorism, the HMMWV has been pushed 
beyond its operational limits.  With emerging warfare technologies, mission payloads are 
increasing and exceeding the current HMMWV capability.  In order to meet current 
battlefield demands, the Army requires a more capable replacement for the HMMWV.  
In OIF and the associated Iraq peacekeeping missions, U.S. Forces are using the 
HMMWV to conduct levels of combat that exceed vehicle design.  Unfortunately, the 
basic armor kit on the HMMWV offers only slightly better ballistic and blast protection 
than its predecessor, the M151 MUTT.  Any HMMWV model without the up-armor 
conversion kit is susceptible to almost any kind of fire including RPGs, AK-47s, IEDs 
and military-grade land mines.  The armor kits include bullet-proof glass windows, and 
side, rear and underbelly armor plates.  The up-armored kits provide protection from fire 
received from the side, but the armor plates on the underbelly of the vehicle do little to 
protect occupants from mine blasts that occur below the vehicle.12  However, the 
increased weight of these kits significantly diminishes the vehicle’s overall performance.  
The added weight of the kits makes vehicles incapable of traveling at standard convoy 
speeds, have less maneuverability, and have a lower payload capacity.  Although helpful 
in protecting vehicles and its occupants, up-armor kits do not make HMMWVs meet the 
Army’s increased mission requirements.  In addition to falling short operationally, the 
HMMWV platform itself is an aging technology. 
In 2005, the projected lifecycle of the average HMMWV was approximately 13 
years. 13  However, because of combat, overuse, and harsh environments, HMMWVs last 
no more than two years in Iraq before either requiring major overhaul maintenance or 
scrapping.  This poses a major problem for the Army.  In their current employment, the 
HMMWV’s projected lifecycle drops drastically.  In addition to the projected lifecycle 
                                                 
12 Global Security.  “Up-Armored HMMWV.”; available from http://www.globalsecurity.org; 
INTERNET. 
13 Global Security.  “HMMWV Recapitalization.”; available from http://www.globalsecurity.org; 
INTERNET. 
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being lowered, the average age of the HMMWV fleet is now well above its designed 
service life of 15 years.  Since more than 50% of the current HMMWV fleet was made 
between 1985 and 1991, the average fleet age in FY 07 is now almost 17 years old. 
The diminishing projected lifecycle and the ever-increasing average fleet age has 
rapidly increased Operations & Support (O&S) costs due to frequent malfunctions and 
breakdowns.  The initial solution to curb the rising O&S costs was performing overhaul 
maintenance, thus returning the vehicle to a zero-mile condition.  This “Resetting” of a 
vehicle added an additional 21 years to its lifespan and enhanced its performance.  This 
resetting concept decreased O&S costs by creating more robust vehicles that required less 
frequent and less expensive maintenance.14 
The Resetting program was established in 2000, with the overall goal to decrease 
rising O&S costs from the aging HMMWV fleet by maintaining the average fleet age 
below the 15-year planned service life.  This program was abandoned in 2001 when 
Army leadership determined that the “reset” option was not cost effective.  A more cost 
effective policy – the Recapitalization program – was developed.  This program focuses 
only on fixing the older HMMWV combat variants.  The Recap maintenance consists of 
a drive-train rebuild and a detailed inspect-and-repair process.  The maintenance adds 10 
years to the vehicles’ expected lifespan.  The older M998, M998A1, M1037, M1038 and 
M1097A1 HMMWV variants are “recapped” to the M1097R1 vehicle.  The new drive 
train supports an increased payload and allows for additional armor add-on.  This 
recapping process takes place at Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA (LEAD), 
and Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, TX (RRAD).15 
The Army Recapping Policy is necessary in order to continue using HMMWVs.  
The policy, however, is a temporary solution to the problem of the ever-increasing age of 
the LTWV fleet.  The up-armor kits provide increased, but not sufficient crew protection; 
in addition they weigh down the vehicles, thus reducing mobility and payload 
performance.  The armor, however, is required.  The trade-off between performance and 
                                                 




force protection means the HMMWV still cannot meet current mission requirements.  
The Army needs a new vehicle in order to lower the average age of the LTWV fleet, 
thereby meeting increased operational capabilities while achieving sufficient force 
protection. 
B. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 
Beginning in 2006, U.S. Army and Marine Corps officials began researching the 
possibilities for creating a new LTWV to replace the aging HMMWV.  Current U.S. 
military operations indicate that the future LTWV fleet must include increased 
expeditionary abilities as well as improved conventional combat capabilities.  The United 
States’ involvement in the Global War on Terrorism indicates a declining probability that 
U.S. forces will be involved in conventional large-scale combat operations.  Instead, U.S. 
forces are more likely to be faced with “decentralized, small, unconventional, yet highly 
lethal forces.”16 
Fighting against insurgency operations requires increased mobility to cover an 
extended battlespace.  The JLTV must provide concentrated combat power with a 
smaller, more mobile force.  Additionally, the JLTV must meet the support and 
sustainability requirements of forces in remote areas.  In the past, larger fighting vehicles 
such as the Stryker, Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), and Bradley fighting vehicle 
assumed the responsibility of the light tactical mobility mission.  However, in the war 
against terrorism, that responsibility has now fallen upon the LTWV fleet.   The lack of 
mobility and the Army’s desire to project a peacekeeping image caused this shift.  
The Ground Combat Forces Light Tactical Mobility Initial Capabilities Document 
(ICD) identified five gaps in current light tactical mobility transportation: 
• Gap 1 – Inability to move mounted Infantry/Combat Arms forces via ground. 
• Gap 2 – Inability to move mounted Combat Support (CS) forces via ground. 
• Gap 3 – Inability to move mounted Combat Service Support (CSS) forces via 
ground. 
                                                 
16 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), ii. 
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• Gap 4 – Inability to move Light Infantry (Airborne/Air Assault) via ground. 
• Gap 5 – Inability to move Long Range Reconnaissance (undetected) via 
ground. 
Solutions to the gaps must be progressive, moving away from threat-based Cold 
War era garrison force to a responsive expeditionary force that focuses on mobility, 
survivability, flexibility and self-sustainability.17 
The JLTV fleet will include variants responsible for Combat Arms (CA), Combat 
Support (CS), Combat Service Support (CSS) and Long-Range Surveillance.  Depending 
on the mission, each of the variants will excel in different categories, but each variant 
must perform proficiently in the following characteristics: 
• Force Protection (occupant protection):  Concepts to achieve this include 
scalable armor to provide mission flexibility while protecting occupants. 
• Survivability (vehicle survivability):  Survivability includes mitigation of 
electronic IED defeat, shot detection/warning, self-recovery capability, 
running on flat tires, and instant fire suppression in engine and cabin. 
• Transportability:  Vehicle transportability by a range of lift assets, including 
rotary wing aircraft.  Makes vehicles quickly deployable, an important 
characteristic in insurgency warfare. 
• Mobility:  Maneuverability to enable operations across the spectrum of terrain.  
Improvements on the HMMWV include increased maximum cruising range 
and speed, increased fuel efficiency, and less frequent refueling. 
• Net-Readiness:  Connectivity for improved Battlespace Awareness (BA) and 
responsive, well-integrated Command and Control (C2).  Features include 
sufficient electrical power, long range On The Move (OTM) communications, 
and a tactical workstation. 
                                                 
17 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 1-2. 
15 
• Sustainability:  The ability to operate independently without support 
attachments for short periods of time.  Features include two days of supplies 
and modularity of sustainment items to enable rapid replenishing and 
refueling capabilities. 
• Payload:  Increased ability to move cargo, troops and weapons relative to the 
HMMWV.  Payload requirements must be met after the vehicle’s armor is 
attached. 18 19 
In the present proposal, there are five general JLTV types.  Each general type of 
JLTV will have several different configurations.  Within each configuration lie several 
sub-configurations, defined by the vehicle’s mission requirements.  Each sub-
configuration corresponds to a separate JLTV variant.  Among the five types there are a 
total of 18 sub-configurations, therefore 18 possible vehicle variants.  The five general 
JLTV types are the Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV), the Long Range Surveillance 
Vehicle (LRS), the Utility Vehicle Light (UVL), the Utility Vehicle Heavy (UVH) and 
the Ground Maneuver Vehicle (GMV). 
Increment I in the JLTV Capability Development Document (CDD) states that the 
first set of JLTVs is scheduled to begin production by 2012.  The initial procurement 
numbers for the Army are 5,500 JLTVs.   Increment II of the JLTV CDD states that by 
2016 updated JLTV variants should be fleet ready.  Between Increment I and II, JLTV 
manufacturers are expected to research and to improve the design of Increment I JLTVs.  
Areas of focus include force protection, fuel efficiency, power generation, and net-
readiness.  Acquisition goals for Increment II indicate that a total of 33,137 JLTVs should 
be produced starting in 2016.20 
The Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) will replace the M966, M966A1, M998, 
M998A1, M1025, M1025A1, M1025A2, M1026, M1026A1, M1038, M1038A1 and 
M1114 HMMWV variants.  Like its namesake, the CTV will primarily be an armament 
                                                 
18 Global Security.  “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).”; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org; INTERNET. 
19 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 2. 
20 Ibid, 23. 
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carrier and a light fighting vehicle.  The CTV configurations are a Close Combat 
Weapons Carrier and a Light Infantry Carrier.  The sub-configurations of the Close 
Combat Weapons Carrier are the reconnaissance vehicle, heavy guns carrier, and anti-
tank missile carrier.  The sub-configurations of the Light Infantry Carrier are the infantry 
carrier, command and control (C2) vehicle, ambulance vehicle and utility vehicle.  
Because of its mission, the CTV will be a lighter vehicle, which increases its Measures of 
Performance (MOP) in mobility, such as maximum cruising range, maximum cruising 
miles per hour, top miles per hour, and fuel efficiency.  The low Gross Vehicle Weight 
(GVW) increases its airlift transportability.21 
There will, however, be a substantial amount of armor built into the CTV, adding 
to the GVW and decreasing payload capacity but significantly improving sustainability 
and force protection to shield the vehicle and its occupants.  Design improvements, such 
as a V-shaped hull, are being considered to decrease damage sustained from an IED 
attack.  Other improvements include more protection provided to the top mounted 
gunner.  These improvements are best seen in Figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8. CTV conceptual design produced by Oshkosh Truck Corporation22 
 
The Long Range Surveillance Vehicle (LRS) will replace the M1109 and M1114 
HMMWV variants.  The LRS only possesses one configuration, the Long Range 
                                                 
21 Global Security.  “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).”; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org; INTERNET. 
22 Defense Update.  “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.” (2006); available from http://www.defense-
update.com; INTERNET. 
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Surveillance configuration.  There are two sub-configurations, the long range surveillance 
vehicle and the general purpose command and control (C2) vehicle.  The important 
measures for the LRS design are mobility and net-readiness.  In order to make the LRS 
more mobile the GVW will be lighter than any of the other JLTV variants, approximately 
20,000 lbs.  This will allow increased mobility, but, will lower payload capacity.23 
The Utility Vehicle Light (UVL) will replace the M998, M998A1, M1038, 
M1038A1, M1037, M1042, M1069 light utility vehicles and the M996, M996A1, M1035 
and M1035A1 light ambulance vehicles.  The UVL has two configurations, the Light 
Cargo Carrier and the Light Prime Mover configuration.  The Light Cargo Carrier 
configuration has three sub-configurations: the ambulance, the utility vehicle and the 
shelter carrier.  The Prime Mover Light configuration only has one sub-configuration: the 
prime mover vehicle variant.  The prime mover’s job is to tow the 105mm Howitzer or 
the Q-36 Radar. The most important measure for the UVL is payload capacity.  This  
means the UVLs will have a greater GVW but will possess a much higher payload 
capacity than either the CTV or the LRS (5,100 lbs vs. 4,000 and 3,500 lbs 
respectively).24 
The Utility Vehicle Heavy (UVH) will replace the M1043 and M1044 heavy 
armament vehicles, M1097, M1097A1, and M1097A2 heavy utility vehicles, and the 
M997, M997A1 heavy ambulance vehicles.  The UVH configurations are Heavy Troop 
Transport, Heavy Cargo Carrier, and the Heavy Prime Mover.  The sub-configurations 
for the Heavy Troop Transport are the protected troop transport and the convoy 
protection platform.  The sub-configurations for the Heavy Cargo Carrier are the 
ambulance/treatment vehicle, utility vehicle, and shelter carrier.  There is only one sub-
configuration for the Heavy Prime Mover, the prime mover sub-configuration.  Like the  
                                                 




UVL, the UVH places its highest performance priority on payload capacity.  The UVH 
will be a heavy utility vehicle, capable of a greater payload capacity and more seats than 
the UVL.25 
The Ground Maneuver Vehicle (GMV) is the last in the JLTV family of vehicles.  
The GMV will replace the M1097, M1097A1, and M1097A2 heavy utility vehicles.  Its 
production is not expected until Increment II, therefore little information is available.  
The GMV will be a heavily armored vehicle with a crew of two (operator and gunner), 
capable of transporting a nine man infantry squad with organic combat loads over long 
distances.  The GMV will also be capable of mounting a crew operated weapon as well as 
be a host to a joint communication system.26  A concise list of the JLTV variants and 
their missions are listed in the table below.  For more detailed explanations of all the 
JLTV sub-configurations, see Appendix A.27 
                                                 
25 Global Security.  “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).”; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org; INTERNET. 
26 U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command.  “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Request for Information 
(JLTV RFI).”; available from http://contracting.tacom.army.mil; INTERNET. 
27 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 98. 
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JLTV Variant Configuration Sub-Configuration 
Combat Tactical Vehicle CTV1A Reconnaissance 
Combat Tactical Vehicle CTV2A Light Armament 
Combat Tactical Vehicle CTV3A Light Armament 
Combat Tactical Vehicle CTV4A Light Utility 
Combat Tactical Vehicle CTV5A C2 
Combat Tactical Vehicle CTV6A Light Ambulance 
Combat Tactical Vehicle CTV7A Light Utiliity 
Long Range Surveillance Vehicle LRS1A Reconnaissance 
Long Range Surveillance Vehicle LRS2A C2 
Utility Vehicle Light UVL1 Light Ambulance 
Utility Vehicle Light UVL2 Light Utilty 
Utility Vehicle Light UVL3 Light Shelter 
Utility Vehicle Light UVL4 Prime Mover 
Utility Vehicle Heavy UVH1 Heavy Armament 
Utility Vehicle Heavy UVH2 Heavy Ambulance 
Utility Vehicle Heavy UVH3 Heavy Utility 
Utility Vehicle Heavy UVH4 Heavy Shelter 
Ground Maneuver Vehicle GMV1 Heavy Utility 
 
Table 2.   JLTV Variant/Configuration/Sub-Configuration Table 
 
The Army’s motivation for developing the JLTV is to produce a LTWV capable 
of meeting the mission requirements of today and tomorrow.  The JLTV will meet these 
mission requirements in its ability to excel in a decentralized battlefield.  
20 
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III. ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
This chapter explains the analytical techniques that were necessary to create our 
decision tool.  These techniques explain the theory behind creating MODA models as 
well as the proper formulation of Linear Programs. 
A. VALUE ANALYSIS 
The goal of this research is to provide TACOM with a decision tool to model the 
LTWV modernization.  This tool is a LP with a MODA driving the representation of each 
vehicle variant.  LTWV modernization strategies require decisions between many 
alternatives (LTWV variants) with many competing objectives.  Discussion of these 
competing objectives can be found on pages 14-15.  Decisions of this type require 
MODA.  The specific approach we use is, “Value-Focused Thinking.”28  This process 
flows from qualitative thinking to quantitative evaluation: 
• Define the alternatives to quantify.  In the decision context of LTWV 
modernization, the alternatives are LTWV variants. 
• Identify the qualitative objectives that are relevant to the decision context and 
possible alternatives.   
• Specify the quantitative attributes to measure each objective. 
• Develop a framework combining objective values, resulting in an overall 
alternative value. 
Value-focused thinking is at the center of this process.  It approaches decision 
making in a non-traditional manner.  It first identifies end-state characteristics before 
identifying suitable alternatives that encompass those characteristics.  One can think of 
this method as a “top-down” approach, starting with objectives and ending with 
alternatives.  This moves away from the traditional, alternative-based thinking, which  
                                                 
28 Ralph Keeney. Value Focused Thinking.  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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begins by identifying the available alternatives and then proceeds to choose the best.  
Value-focused thinking assigns values to each alternative, allowing ranking amongst 
them. 
1. Objectives 
Once a decision maker has a clear idea of what embodies an alternative, the 
objectives can be defined.  “An objective is a statement of something that one desires to 
achieve… characterized by three features: a decision context, an object, and a direction of 
preference.”29  An objective does not need to be measurable or tangible, but just 
represent an ideal for which to aim.  In other words, an objective is a qualitative measure 
of an alternative.  For example, in the decision of purchasing a vehicle, safety could be an 
objective.  In this case, the decision context is purchasing a vehicle, while the object is 
safety, and the direction is that more safety is preferred to less safety. 
There are two distinct types of objectives, fundamental objectives and means 
objectives.  “A fundamental objective characterizes an essential reason for interest in the 
decision situation…”30  A means objective defines a means to achieve a fundamental 
objective.  For example, safety is a fundamental objective, and crash avoidance is a 
means objective to safety.  Fundamental objectives are essential in directing the decision 
making process and evaluating alternatives.  Means objectives are useful for helping to 
break down fundamental objectives into quantitative measures.  We use fundamental 
objectives for the VM to reduce the chances of redundancy, as means objectives may 
influence more than one fundamental objective. 
Identifying objectives is the first step in the process of developing a value-focused 
model.  Once a decision maker establishes a list of desired objectives, the objectives must 
be structured.  This structuring distinguishes between fundamental and means objectives.  
Fundamental objectives may be drawn out by questions such as “Why is this objective  
                                                 
29 Ralph Keeney.  Value Focused Thinking.  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 34. 
30 Ibid, 34. 
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important?” If it is important because it is an “essential reason for interest in the 
situation,” it may be a fundamental objective.  To be a fundamental objective, the 
alternative also must completely control the qualitative measure. 
Objective hierarchies can be developed either from the top down or the bottom 
up.  Depending on the situation, one may be preferable to the other.  An example 
pertaining to vehicle mobility will be used to demonstrate these concepts.  A top-down, 
or objectives driven approach is appropriate when “alternatives are not well specified at 
the start of the analysis” and “start[s] with the overall objective and successively sub-
divide[s] objectives.”31 The lower objectives that result from these subdivisions specify 
“what aspects of the higher-level objective are important.”32 Using the top-down 
approach, the objectives shown in Figure 9 would have been developed first by 
identifying “maximize mobility” as a fundamental objective, then decomposing this 
fundamental objective into two supporting fundamental sub-objectives.  Maximizing 
speed and acceleration are fundamental to maximizing mobility.  Decomposition breaks 
down an objective into its component objectives, for which individual attributes are 
found.  Decomposition can help when there are multiple goals encompassed in an 
objective.  Decomposition usually leads to clearer attributes; however it comes at the 
price of requiring more information.  A bottom-up, or alternatives driven approach is 
appropriate when known alternatives are available.  Starting at the lowest level, the 
objectives aim to capture the differences between the alternatives.  The same example of 
mobility is developed by identifying that vehicle alternatives can be distinguished by 
their speed and acceleration.  Then speed and acceleration would be grouped under the 
broader category of mobility.  Hence, the bottom-up approach.  The top-down approach 
is generally preferred to the bottom-up approach.  However, using the bottom-up 
approach in conjunction with the top-down approach can produce useful results.  Top-up, 
or starting from the top and looking upwards, identifies fundamental objectives from 
means objectives.  Bottom-up is also a good tool to check the objective hierarchy 
structure and ensure the relationships between objectives are logical.   
                                                 
31 Craig Kirkwood.  Strategic Decision Making.  (San Francisco: Duxbury Press, 1982), 20. 
32 Ralph Keeney.  Value Focused Thinking.  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 71. 
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Figure 9. Mobility objectives 
 
When defining an objective hierarchy, it should exhibit the following traits:33 34 
• Essentiality, requiring every objective to be important enough to include in the 
model  
• Controllability, such that the alternative in question controls each objective 
• Completeness, such that the objectives collectively embody the alternative 
• Measurability, such that each objective is quantifiable 
• Operability, making it feasible to collect the data to complete the analysis 
• Independence, ensuring each objective may be treated separately 
• Non-redundancy, avoiding any possible double-counting of a consequence 
• Conciseness, making the hierarchy as simple as possible while completely 
representing the alternative 
• Understandability, allowing potential users to understand each objective 
Objective hierarchies alone have several benefits, both inside and outside of their 
role in forming value models.  An objective hierarchy frames the scope of the problem at 
hand.  Structuring objectives into a hierarchy allows the decision maker to spot any 
potential holes in the model.  The model is then ready to be used in the value model 
formulation.  It can assist in thinking about the model, analyze the role of each objective, 
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34 Craig Kirkwood.  Strategic Decision Making.  (San Francisco: Duxbury Press, 1982), 16. 
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and help specify appropriate attributes for each objective.  It may also act as a guide in 
collecting information, to ensure that not only is the correct and necessary information 
collected, but that effort is not expended to collect excess information.  Objective 
hierarchies give insight to the necessary performance of the alternatives. 
2. Attributes 
The next step in establishing a value model is adding attributes to the objective 
hierarchy.  Each attribute quantitatively measures the achievement of a fundamental 
objective.  An attribute should emphasize the intent of the objective.  The three types of 
attributes are natural, constructed, and proxy.  Each is addressed in detail below.  Figure 
10 shows an objective hierarchy with attributes.  The objective hierarchy represents a 
vehicle purchase decision with respect to its environmental effects.  Here, “maximize fuel 
efficiency,” “minimize decrease to quality of life,” and “maximize environmental 
protection” are attributes measuring the fundamental objective “minimize environmental 
effects.”  The circles associated with each attribute are the measures used to define their 


















Figure 10. Objective hierarchy with corresponding attributes 
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a. Natural Attributes 
Natural attributes “have a common interpretation to everyone.”35 
Natural attributes are measured in understandable units, such as pounds or cubic 
feet.  In the problem described in Figure 10, miles per gallon (MPG) could be a 
natural attribute to describe “maximize fuel efficiency.”  It’s important to note 
that MPG is not the only possible attribute for “maximize fuel efficiency.”  
If possible, a natural attribute should be assigned to each objective.  
If a natural attribute is not available, options include a constructed attribute, or a 
proxy attribute. 
b. Constructed Attributes 
Every objective does not necessarily have a natural attribute.  If a 
natural attribute is not available, a constructed attribute designed specifically for 
the objective may be used.  A constructed attribute may help to describe a concept 
like quality of life, where there is no natural unit of measurement.  Constructed 
attributes are only relevant within the problem they are developed for.  Returning 
to the vehicle example of Figure 10, a survey measuring quality of life 
degradation due to increased vehicle pollution is an example of a constructed 
attribute.  A survey specifically describes different levels of an objective in words, 
and associates them with a value.  Well-known examples of constructed attributes 
include the Richter scale and the Dow Jones industrial average. 
c. Proxy Attributes 
A proxy attribute is used when the actual attribute that one wishes 
to apply is too difficult to measure.  A proxy attribute is used in the actual 
attribute’s place.  In the vehicle example, emission levels could be a proxy for 
measuring the effect of a vehicle on environmental health.  Proxy attributes 
reduce the effort necessary to gather data.  However, proxy attributes should be 
                                                 
35 Ralph Keeney. Value Focused Thinking.  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 101. 
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used with caution, as they have less intuitive meaning.  It is necessary to be very 
specific in the objective to ensure proxy attributes are used correctly.36 
Attributes have three desirable properties.  These properties ensure that each 
attribute clarifies the objective it measures.  An attribute should be measurable, 
operational, and understandable. 
A measurable attribute defines the objective it measures in more detail than that 
provided by the objective alone.  An attribute should emphasize what aspects of the 
objective are important.37  Establishing measurability in natural attributes is fairly simple. 
Problems are more likely to occur with constructed or proxy attributes.38  It can be 
unclear as to what exactly a constructed attribute accounts for, making it difficult to 
ascertain whether it is an appropriate attribute to measure an objective. 
An operational attribute describes the possible levels of achievement associated 
with an objective.  In other words, an attribute must be able to express relative 
preferences amongst the alternatives for different levels of achievement.  Attributes may 
need a short description to make them operational.  For instance, because measurements 
should be taken in consistent circumstances, these circumstances must be explained.  
Information pertaining to critical levels of the attribute is necessary to judge a level’s 
desirability.  For example, when judging the desirability of emission levels, knowledge of 
emission standards is necessary. 
An attribute is understandable if there is no ambiguity in describing or 
interpreting an alternative in terms of its attributes.39 This implies that there is “no loss of  
information” between one person’s assignment of an attribute and another’s interpretation 
of it.  Creating an understandable attribute requires the ability to be precise in 
measurement. 
                                                 
36 Ralph Keeney. Value Focused Thinking.  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 120. 
37 Ibid, 113. 
38 Ibid, 113. 
39 Ibid, 116. 
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Attribute interaction affects whether a model is either additive or multiplicative.  
As proved by Keeney and Raiffa, each attribute {X1, X2,…, Xn} must be mutually 
preferentially independent for the resulting value function vi(x1, x2,…, xn) to be strictly 
additive.40  This means that in an additive model, each attribute is associated with a 
single objective.  Problems are most likely to occur with proxy attributes, which may 
influence more than one objective, violating mutual exclusivity.  The TACOM value 
model is an additive model because all objectives are fundamental to the decision 
context, i.e., mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. 
3. Quantitative Value Model 
After development of the qualitative value model, i.e., the objective hierarchy and 
attributes, we next must develop the quantitative value model.  The quantitative value 
model combines the objective hierarchy and attributes to give an overall value for an 
alternative.  In the LTWV VM, each vehicle variant is a separate alternative.  
The first step in the development of the quantitative value model is to determine a 
multiple dimension value function.  This value function combines the values obtained 
from each of the single-dimension value functions (SDVF) for each attribute into a single 
value for each alternative.  For each attribute n, it consists of two parts, a SDVF vi(xi) and 















1     (1) 
An SDVF, vi(xi), is specified for each attribute.  The SDVF defines the 
relationship between the measured amount of an attribute and the degree to which that 
amount accomplishes the objective.  The SDVF assigns a value for the level of 
accomplishment.  The values from all attributes need to be compatible, so normalization 
is required. 
The relationship between the measured amount of an attribute, i.e., its level, and 
its value may take any form.  Common relationships include linear, increasing returns to 
                                                 
40 Ralph Keeney, L., H. Raiffa. Decision Making with Multiple Objectives. (Wisley, NY. 1976). 
41 Ibid. 
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scale, and decreasing returns to scale.  Returns to scale is the marginal value of each 
successive unit.  A linear relationship shows constant returns to scale, as each successive 
attribute level has a constant marginal value.  Increasing returns to scale implies that as 
the attribute level increases, the marginal value that each successive unit receives 
increases.  Decreasing returns to scale is the opposite; as the attribute level increases, the 
marginal value that each successive unit receives decreases.  The SDVF should include 
any insight from critical attribute levels.  Critical attribute levels can include requirement, 
quota, or saturation levels.  A method of determining the piecewise linear SDVF is 
discussed below. 
A piecewise linear value function consists of several linear segments joined 
together.  The value function relates an attribute’s score or level (the measure input) to a 
value (the SDVF output).  Values range along a scale, usually 0 to 1, to represent the 
range of the attribute.  Though the most common scale is 0 to 1, other scales are 
permissible.  We chose to use 0 to 10 so as to distinguish a value from a percent.  A 
SDVF should be defined over the range of the worst to best levels received by available 
alternatives to maximize the ability to distinguish between them.  The procedure for 
developing a piecewise linear function is as follows: 
• Attach a relative value to each level of the attribute.  For example, Level A, 10 
pounds, is twice as valuable as Level B, 5 pounds. 
• Assign the value of to x to the smallest relative value. 
• Convert each level of relative importance into a multiple of x. 
• Solve for x with the equation 
Relative Values = 10∑  
• Plug in the value of x to each relative value to solve. 
At this point, each level of the attribute has been assigned a value; however it is not yet a 
continuous function.  Between each level, a straight line is drawn, and scores between 
levels are interpolated on that line.  An SDVF must be developed for each attribute. 
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The assessment of the SDVFs is the most important part of building the 
quantitative model.  As discussed previously, defining a SDVF for an attribute allows the 
decision maker to express returns to scale, as well as any other external critical attribute 
levels.  These critical attribute levels can be anything from requirement to saturation 
levels.  Subject matter expert input is critical at this phase of model development.  The 
ability to associate levels of desirability with scores for a measure gives MODA its ability 
to accurately reflect factors in the outside environment and value judgments. 
At this point, the individual attributes of an alternative can be measured and valued.  The 
next step is to combine these attribute values together to give an overall value 
corresponding to the overarching fundamental objective. 
a. Swing Weight Matrix 
The attributes have a weighted impact on the overall fundamental 
objective value.  The process of determining the weight of each attribute is known as the 
Swing Weight Matrix.  Trainor et al42 introduced the Swing Weight Matrix, and Ewing et 
al43 extended and operationalized it in their 2005 Base Realignment and Closure analysis.  
The Swing Weight Matrix uses both an attribute’s relative importance and as well as the 
variability within the data to assess its weight.  As described by Ewing et al, the method 
has four steps:44 
• Define the importance and variance dimensions. 
• Place the value measures in the matrix. 
• Assess the swing weights. 
• Calculate the global weights. 
                                                 
42 T. Trainor, G. Parnell, B. Kwinn, J. Brence, E. Tollefson, R. Burk, P. Downes, W. Bland, J. 
Wolder, and J. Harris.  “USMA Study Of the Installation Management Agency CONUS Region Structure”.  
(West Point, NY, 2004). 
43 P. Ewing, W. Tarantino, and G. Parnell. “Use of Decision Analysis in the Army Base Realignment 
and Closure (BRAC) 2005 Military Value Analysis.”  Decision Analysis (March 2006): 41. 
44 Ibid, 41-42. 
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The first step is to define the importance and variance dimensions.  
Importance is a definition of precisely what is important in the decision context.  For 
example, in Ewing et al’s 2005 Base Realignment and Closure analysis, importance was 
defined as “the Army’s ability to change an installation’s attribute level.”45  Certain 
attributes in their model, such as acreage, were unchangeable, while others, like office 
space, could be modified by spending money.  Variability refers to the change in value 
resulting from swinging an attribute from its lowest possible level to its highest.  An 
attribute which does not possess much variability will not be useful in distinguishing 
between alternatives.  Figure 11 is the Swing Weight Matrix for the 2005 BRAC 
example, with importance, or ability to change, increasing from right to left across the 
columns, and variability increasing from bottom to top along the rows. 
 
Figure 11. BRAC swing weight matrix 46 
 
 The second step is to place the value measures in the matrix.  The decision 
maker judges each attribute according to the criteria of importance and variability.  More 
than one attribute may occupy a cell in the matrix.  It is necessary to keep in mind that the 
                                                 
45 P. Ewing, W. Tarantino, and G. Parnell. “Use of Decision Analysis in the Army Base Realignment 
and Closure (BRAC) 2005 Military Value Analysis.”  Decision Analysis (March 2006): 41. 
46 Ibid, 42. 
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definition of importance may not correspond to an attribute’s criticality.  In Figure 11, 
bold and italics are used to identify those attributes considered critical.  Subject matter 
experts should be consulted at this step to ensure proper placement. 
 Step three assesses the swing weights.  A matrix swing weight, fi, is 
assigned to all cells in the matrix.47  It is “important to ensure the proper range of weights 
[exists] between the highest and lowest weighted attribute[s].”48  In, the 2005 BRAC 
example, swing weights range from 0 to 100.  The highest, in this case 100, is placed in 
the upper-left corner, and the lowest, 1, is placed in the lower-right corner.  A swing 
weight of 0 corresponds to no influence in the model, and is equivalent to not including 
that attribute at all.  The rest of the matrix is filled in accordingly to reflect importance 
and variation. 
 The fourth and last step of the process calculates the global weight of each 












, where fi = matrix swing weight corresponding to attribute i (2) 
 Ewing et al assert that the Swing Weight Matrix procedure has the 
following advantages over other weight assessment methods.  By developing an explicit 
definition of importance, it gives a concrete interpretation of the weights and eliminates 
an element of subjectivity.  It also “forces explicit consideration of the variation of 
measures.”50  As stated previously, if an attribute does not possess enough variation in  
                                                 
47 P. Ewing, W. Tarantino, and G. Parnell. “Use of Decision Analysis in the Army Base Realignment 
and Closure (BRAC) 2005 Military Value Analysis.”  Decision Analysis (March 2006): 41. 
48 Ibid, 41. 
49 Ibid, 42. 
50 Ibid, 42. 
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the levels that objects achieve, it will not be useful for distinguishing between objects.  
The resulting framework allows for consistent swing weight assessments, which are then 
simply and easily justifiable. 
 The implementation of the model combines the raw data, the SDVF and 
the weights to produce an overall fundamental objective value for an alternative.  For a 
given alternative, each of its attribute levels, xi, is plugged into its respective SDVF, vi, to 
find an attribute value.  These values are combined, for each alternative, using Equation 
1. 
 The meaning of this number can be thought of as the “proportion of the 
distance, in a value sense” the alternative is from the absolute worst alternative, which 
would receive a value of 0, and the ideal alternative, which would receive a value of 10.51  
The worst and best objects may only be hypothetical.  Alternative values can be used for 
comparisons and decision making and works best when there are a limited number of 
alternatives.   When decisions must be made between a large number of alternatives, or a 
portfolio of alternatives must be decided, then mathematical programming should be used 
to generate these portfolios. 
 
 
                                                 
51 Craig Kirkwood.  Strategic Decision Making.  (San Francisco: Duxbury Press, 1982), 74. 
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B. LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
Linear Programming (LP) is the mathematical subject of optimizing (minimizing 
or maximizing) a linear objective function over a set of linear constraints.  LP is an 
integral subject in operations research, enabling mathematicians to solve a wide range of 
problems from economics to engineering.52   
An American named George Dantzig developed LP during World War II as a 
method to reduce expenditure costs while increasing damage dealt to the enemy.  Dantzig 
published the formulation necessary to create LPs as well as an algorithm, called the 
simplex method, to solve them.  The algorithm is an iterative method guaranteeing an 
optimal solution if one exists.  It allows LPs, which previously took enormous amounts of 
time and computing power, to be solved quickly and efficiently.  The methodology was 
declassified in 1947 and quickly became a tool for commercial optimization.53 
There are many uses for LP.  Among others, the subject applies to economics, 
business management, finance management, and project management.  This thesis uses 
LP to find a feasible modernization strategy for the LTWV fleet that meets budgetary and 
operational constraints. 
The standard form for expressing LPs is to state which direction you are 
optimizing (minimizing or maximizing), what you are optimizing (the objective 
function), followed by the constraints which the solution must meet.  In the end, a LP 
looks as follows: 
Maximize (or Minimize) cTx 
Subject to  
Where  
 
 “x” represents the vector of variables.  “c” represents the coefficients associated with 
each variable.  “A” and “b” make up the coefficients for the constraints. 
                                                 




Geometrically, the linear constraints in the problem define a convex region known 
as the feasible region.  Because the objective function must also be linear, the local 
optimal solution must be the global optimal solution.  In other words once you find an 
optimal solution to the objective function, it is guaranteed to be the optimal solution to 
the problem.  Also, because of the linearity of the objective function, the optimal solution 
is guaranteed to lie on the boundary of the feasible region.  An example of a feasible 
region is seen in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. A Graphical Representation of a Feasible Region 
 
LPs can be formulated where no optimal solution exists.  If constraints contradict 
each other there is no feasible region.  Therefore the LP has no solution.  Also, 
constraints in an LP can create an unbounded feasible region, where ever increasing 
higher or lower (depending on if the problem is maximizing or minimizing) solutions can 
always be found.  This clearly creates a situation where no optimal solution exists.  The 
unbounded feasible region would not be a polyhedron but rather a plane.  However, if the 
feasible region is a convex polyhedron (as seen in Figure 12) there exists an optimal 
solution. 
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A series of linear constraints intersect to create the feasible region.  Any 
combination of values within that region creates a feasible answer, and an optimal answer 
exists along the borders of the feasible region, most likely at an intersection of two or 
more constraints.54  
The simplex algorithm, developed by Dantzig, solves LPs by iteratively testing 
possible optimal solutions.  Dantzig proved that if a LP is capable of possessing an 
optimal solution, that optimal solution must lie on the boundaries of the feasible region.  
In most cases, that solution lies in a vertex of the feasible polyhedron, or the intersection 
of two or more constraints.  The algorithm uses that theorem and walks along the 
boundaries of the feasible region, looking for an optimal solution. 
If all of the decision variables in a particular linear program are required to be 
integers, then the program is further classified as an Integer Linear Program (ILP).  ILPs 
are sometimes very difficult for a computer to solve because of the combinatorial nature 
of the problem.  Because LPs with continuous decision variables are easier to solve, we 
have formulated our problem as an LP where we allow for fractional solutions.  This 
approach is acceptable for our problem because the magnitudes of our decision variables 
(numbers of vehicles bought, recapped, and retired) are such that rounding of these 
variables will not affect the prescribed policies.   For example, the number of recapped 
vehicles or new vehicles proposed by the LP will most likely be in the hundreds in any 
given year.  In other words, rounding from 102.6 to 103 vehicles will have very little 
effect on the solution. 
The LTWV LP was implemented using the General Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS), a high level algebraic modeling language designed for professional level 
optimization.  GAMS is capable of solving Linear, Non-Linear, Integer and Mixed 
Integer Programs when coupled with an appropriate solver.  The solver used with our test 
problem was CPLEX; the best general purpose linear programming solver available.55 
                                                 
54 J. Noyes and E. Weisstein.  “Linear Programming.”  (2005); available from 
http://www.mathwworld.com/LinearProgramming.html; INTERNET. 




A. LTWV VALUE MODEL 
1. Objective Hierarchy 
The development of the LTWV value model addresses the situation of 
quantifying a LTWV for the purpose of making fleet inventory decisions.  The model 
was developed from HMMWV and JLTV requirements documents as well as subject 
matter experts in order to accurately reflect important aspects, capabilities, and 
requirements of these vehicles. 
The qualitative model was developed using the procedure and guidance specified 
in Keeney’s Value Focused Thinking and Kirkwood’s Strategic Decision Making (see 
Chapter III).  Information was gathered from the HMMWV Operational Requirements 
Document and the JLTV Capability Development Document to identify objectives and 
attributes.  A top-down approach was used, starting from the Key Performance 
Parameters (KPPs) of the JLTV CDD.  These KPPs, Mobility, Transportability, Net-
Readiness, Force Protection, Survivability, Payload, and Materiel Availability, are the 
basis of the model, and served as the initial objectives.56  We divided objectives into sub-
objectives until attributes could clearly be assigned.  Subject matter experts LTC Lee 
Ewing and LTC Stuart Rogers were then consulted to ensure the objectives and attributes 
accurately represented a vehicle.  LTC Ewing is an expert in the field of decision 
analysis, and LTC Rogers an expert in TWVs.  LTC Rogers gave us recommendations 
for our single-dimensional value functions (SDVF) and weights.  LTC Ewing ensured the 
value model accurately reflected those recommendations.  We used the swing weight 
matrix to assess weights from the bottom up.  Each attribute was weighted individually 
and combined resulting in the overall weights for each fundamental objective.  The 
resulting objective hierarchy with attributes is below: 
                                                 
56 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 




o Attribute (units) 
 
• Mobility 
o Vehicle mobility 
 Speed 
• Maximum cruising range (miles) 
• Top MPH (miles per hour) 
• Acceleration (seconds, 0 – 60 mph) 
 % Incline 
• Maximum speed on 5% grade (miles per hour) 
• Maximum % grade (% grade) 
 Fuel efficiency (ton miles per gallon) 
 Maneuverability 
• Maximum fording depth (feet) 
• Turning radius (feet) 
o Transportability 
 Air (tons, gross vehicle weight) 
 Sea (volume, vehicle space occupied) 
• Net-Readiness 
o Alternator size (amps) 
• Survivability 
o Force protection (inhabitants) 
 Force protection (protection level 1-4) 
o Vehicle safety 
 Crash survival (% GVW supported in rollover) 
 Crash avoidance (% go given dry normal conditions) 
o Payload 
 Capacity 
• Maximum weight (pounds) 
• Cargo area (cubic feet) 
• Number of seats (count) 
 Towing capacity (pounds) 
o Sustainability 
 Reliability (MMBOMF) 
 Total ownership (FY08$) 
 Maintenance (operational availability) 
 
Figure 13. Objective Hierarchy of Attributes 
 
We chose every objective and attribute carefully to accurately represent a vehicle 
capability in the context of the performance requirement in the CDD.  The remainder of 
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this section will be devoted to the justification and explanation of each objective and 
attribute in this model.  The version of the model presented here is as complete as 
possible, and includes all objectives on which vehicles are scored.  Though these 
objectives are all valid, in the end, some were dropped from the final model used in this 
analysis for reasons of redundancy, lack of data, or lack of variation within the data.  It 
should be clarified that if an objective is dropped for lack of variation within the data, this 
does not imply that the objective is not important, but instead that the objective provides 
no additional insight into distinguishing between vehicles.  The final inclusion or 
exclusion of each objective is addressed within the individual sections below.  We 
assessed each of the following attributes by using a piecewise linear SDVF approach.  
Value increments were assessed through subject matter expert input from various 
sources.  The assessments were not conducted in person; however, they were conducted 
over conference phone calls and the results staffed by the U.S. Army Combined Arms 
Support Command (CASCOM). 
a. Mobility 
Mobility is one of three of the top-tier objectives, encompassing both the 
mobility of a vehicle itself and the transportability of a vehicle.  The mobility objective is 
designed to represent a vehicle’s tactical and operational mobility.  It is crucial to mission 
fulfillment that a vehicle have excellent tactical mobility, as it “will be employed across 
the range of military operations and must be capable of precise, decisive maneuver, 
horizontal and vertical, day and night, in all terrain and weather conditions.”57  A 
vehicle’s operational mobility or transportability is an expression of the need to “support 
inter-theater strategic deployment and intra-theater operational maneuver.”58  It is 
advantageous if a vehicle can be being transported by existing Army assets in a timely 
manner. 
Within vehicle mobility, sub-objectives include speed, performance on 
incline, fuel efficiency, and maneuverability.  Speed is a critical aspect of a vehicle’s 
                                                 
57 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 20. 
58 Ibid, 22. 
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ability to complete missions and succeed operationally.  Vehicles need to be able to 
operate for prolonged periods of time at speeds ranging from cruising to sprint.  The 
following attributes aim to capture both parts of this speed requirement. 
 Maximum cruising range, measured in miles, is described in the JLTV 
CDD as the “distance traveled on level paved surface roads at GVW on 
single tank of fuel.”59  It reflects a vehicle’s ability to travel for a long 
period of time at a constant, non-sprint speed.  This would include convoy 
travel and routine movement.  Vehicles must have the required range to be 
“consistent with other Army motor wheeled vehicles.”60  Inability to do so 
“may result in additional fueling stops and possible unacceptable 
reduction in current logistics support efficiency.”61  Maximum cruising 
range’s SDVF has increasing returns to scale, reflecting the increasing 
marginal value in each successive unit of cruising range.  An increased 
cruising range indicates a decreased refueling need, making the vehicle 
more time and cost effective. 
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Figure 14. Value vs. Maximum cruising range 
 
 
                                                 
59 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 27. 
60 U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization.  
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV).  (Fort Eustis, VA: GPO, 2004), 17. 
61 Ibid, 17-18. 
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 Top speed of a vehicle, measured in miles per hour, is the maximum 
sustained speed a vehicle at GVW can achieve over flat paved surfaces.62  
This attribute captures a vehicle’s sprint ability, and attainment of a high 
value in it is crucial to a vehicle having “superior tactical mobility.”63  
Vehicles must “achieve higher road/convoy speeds in response to ongoing 
operational lessons learned,” and this attribute aims to reflect this.64  The 
SDVF for top speed is piecewise linear, with the key point being at 45 
mph, the speed of modern convoys.  The inability to keep up with convoys 
renders the vehicle useless in that context. 
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Figure 15. Value vs. Top MPH 
 
 Acceleration, measured as the seconds necessary to accelerate from 0 to 
60 mph, captures a vehicle’s ability to increase its speed.  Without a 
reasonable amount of acceleration, a vehicle with an ideal top speed is not 
very operationally useful.  Over the range of the data, acceleration has  
                                                 
62 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 33. 
63 Ibid, 33. 
64 Ibid, 33. 
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 constant returns to scale.  However, the data did not have enough 
 variability to significantly distinguish between variants, and was not 
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Figure 16. Value vs. Acceleration 
 
 Vehicles must be able to perform on inclines ranging from hilly to 
mountainous terrain to meet operational needs for which they are designed.  These needs 
range “from utility in nature to direct action to convoy escort to patrolling,” and the 
ability to maintain sustained high speed over graded terrain “allows the Joint ground 
forces to control and drive the operational tempo and operate inside the enemy decision 
cycle.”65 
 Maximum speed on 5% grade at GVW was chosen as an attribute because 
5% represents “an operationally relevant description of hilly to 
mountainous terrain, and it is important that vehicles be able to maintain 
speed on grade for the variety of missions described above.”66  This 
attribute’s SDVF shows constant returns to scale, with the same knee in 
the curve as in top speed.  This break at 45 mph marks convoy speed, with 
vehicles unable to keep up rendered useless in this role. 
                                                 
65 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 34. 
66 Ibid, 34. 
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Figure 17. Value vs. Maximum 5% speed 
 
 Maximum percent grade represents the amount of dry, hard-surfaced 
longitudinal slope that a vehicle can ascend, descend, start and stop on at 
GVW without loss of stability, malfunction, or degradation of stated 
requirements.67  Vehicles must park with the engine off for long enough 
duration “as to assure that there shall be no loss of fluids or other 
malfunction while parked.”68  This requirement assures that vehicles will 
be able to operate in any possible steep terrain conditions that operations 
demand.  The negotiation of “these slopes is essential for the emplacement 
of towed weapons, communications shelter systems, and overall battlefield 
maneuverability.”69  The SDVF for maximum percent grade has constant 
returns to scale; within the range of variation there is no justification for 
anything else. 
                                                 
67 U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization.  
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV).  (Fort Eustis, VA: GPO, 2004), 11. 
68 Ibid, 12. 
69 Ibid, 12. 
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Figure 18. Value vs. Maximum % grade 
 
 Fuel efficiency is a matter of utmost importance to overall operations.  
“After water, fuel is the highest demand, largest throughput commodity on the 
battlefield;” therefore “even comparatively small reductions in fuel consumption have 
large scale effects across the force because of the reduction in fuel movement 
requirements.”70  Reductions in fuel needs “provide commanders greater freedom of 
action and reduce the vulnerability of logistical elements on the battlefield because they 
have to move less [fuel].”71  Executive Order 13423 recognizes this by “mandating that 
future vehicles achieve 2% annual improvements relative to their baselines for fiscal year 
2005.”72 
 Fuel efficiency, measured in ton miles per gallon, is its own natural 
attribute.  Its SDVF has increasing returns to scale, as a result of increased 
gains per successive unit of efficiency achieved.  Increased gains in value 
are achieved by reducing the amount of money spent on purchasing it, 
time and effort spent logistically transporting it, and dependence on fossil 
fuels in accordance with national goals.73 
                                                 
70 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 26-27. 
71 Ibid, 26. 
72 Ibid, 26. 
73 U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization.  
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
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Figure 19. Value vs. Fuel efficiency 
 
 Maneuverability, defined as “the ability to negotiate obstacles found in the 
complex battlespace (natural, man-made, limited space), including all terrains (jungle, 
forest, mountain, desert, urban, etc.) found in the mission profile,” is essential to 
operational success.74  Vehicles should be capable of handling this complex battlespace, 
to include having the capability to “traverse slopes, ford, turn (control direction), cross 
vertical obstacles, breach light natural or manmade obstacles (saplings, gates/fences), 
cross ditches, and push like-sized obstacles from lanes of maneuver.”75 
 Maximum fording depth, measured in inches, represents the depth a 
vehicle at GVW shall be capable of fording in hard bottom salt-water 
obstacles without preparation.76  This capability is required such to “allow 
operations where water fording and amphibious landings are required,” 
and ensure the vehicle is designed to “withstand the most vigorous of 
environmental conditions.”77  This attribute of maneuverability measures a 
vehicle’s ability to handle environmental obstacles.  The SDVF for this 
attribute has decreasing returns to scale, as the Army’s needs are limited to 
                                                 
74 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 36. 
75 Ibid, 33. 
76 Ibid, 60. 
77 U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization.  
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
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a 30 foot fording capability, leaving any additional depth desirable, but 
unnecessary and less valuable than attainment of 30 feet.  The data 
showed that every vehicle is designed to meet this 30 foot requirement, 
eliminating variation, and justifying its exclusion from the final model. 
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Figure 20. Value vs. Maximum fording depth 
 
 Curb to curb turning radius is another attribute of maneuverability, 
capturing a vehicle’s movement ability without regard for obstacles.  It is 
measured in feet, and its SDVF shows constant returns to scale in the 
range of data variation.  The data for this attribute did not show enough 
variability to justify its presence in the final model; without variability, the 
attribute could not distinguish between variants. 
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Figure 21. Value vs. Turning radius 
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 It is important to note that while neither of maneuverability’s attributes 
was included in the final model, this does not imply that maneuverability is not 
important.  Instead, it indicates that they were not useful attributes in distinguishing 
between the different variants. 
 Transportability includes sub-objectives which maximize air and sea 
transport.  These capabilities “provide flexibility for entry operations (permissive and 
non-permissive) to counter threat anti-access strategies by using multiple austere entry 
points to bring in combat configured units.”78 
 Air lift capability is crucial to current operational demands.  “Use of fixed 
wing aircraft permits rapid deployment of forces to (and within) a hostile forward 
operating area.  Rotary wing aircraft allow rapid deployment of forces in a hostile 
forward operating area in support of maneuver.”79  “Movement of Joint forces via rotary 
wing provides the Services an essential vertical envelopment capability critical to the 
execution of their individual service missions.”80  In this model, we chose to focus on 
tactical mobility utilizing rotary wing aircraft, not because fixed wing are unimportant, 
but because fixed wing do not present much variation between variants.   
 GVW is the main determinant of air-lift capability, limiting transport 
through an aircraft’s maximum payload limit.  It shows constant returns to 
scale, emphasizing the criticality of each pound equally.  Aircraft can 
sling-load more than one vehicle if their combined weights are under the 
maximum payload, and every pound of a vehicle’s weight contributes 
equally towards that limit. 
                                                 
78 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 22. 
79 Ibid, 22. 
80 Ibid, 22. 
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Figure 22. Value vs. Gross vehicle weight 
 
 “Sealift allows world-wide deployment of JLTV, supporting pre-
positioning, Sea Basing, and Amphibious force projection capabilities.”81  With the wide 
range of current military operations, it is critical to have the ability to transport forces and 
equipment over large distances.  
 Volume is the main determinant of sealift ability, limited by a ship’s cargo 
area.  It shows constant returns to scale, with each cubic foot weighted 
equally, following the same logic of airlift capability.  Ships may carry 
several vehicles at a time, provided they all fit in the cargo area, and each 
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Figure 23. Value vs. Volume 
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The second top-tier goal is net-readiness, allowing the fleet to “achieve 
interoperability through the seamless integration of Joint and Service C4I systems.”82  
With this in mind, the fleet needs to be able to “operate as part of a joint team and… 
share information both vertically and horizontally throughout the force and across 
boundaries.”83  Current situations predict that vehicles will need “to operate in units 
during distributed as well as close combat operations, mandating that units be able to 
quickly develop, synchronize, and adapt plans to integrate the effects of ISR, Fires and 
Maneuver.”84  “Timely, accurate collaboration is essential to maintaining decision 
superiority over enemy combatants as well as in non-hostile situations…made possible 
by [the ability to] seamlessly share information.”85  Net-readiness is measured by 
alternator size, a proxy for the power available for transmission equipment, such as 
radios. 
 Alternator size represents net-readiness in this context, in that all radios 
and electronic equipment must be powered from the alternator.  A larger 
alternator implies a larger power source, enriching this capability.  
HMMWVs are powered by a 60, 100, 200, or 400 amp belt-driven 
alternator.86  However, it has been shown that a 400 amp alternator is not 
sufficient to “power all on-board systems while at or near engine idle 
(600-900 RPMs).”87  To ensure that JLTVs are not subject to this 
limitation of belt-driven alternators, research is being done on alternative 
technologies, including power take-off, in-line, and parallel hybrid 
propulsion alternators.  As these will not be implemented unless they can 
meet the on-board power requirements, the model represents them as a 
                                                 
82 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 23. 
83 Ibid, 23. 
84 Ibid, 23. 
85 Ibid, 23. 
86 Ibid, 53. 
87 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 53. 
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400 amp alternator, which gives a value of 10.  The SDVF has an odd 
shape to represent the ability of a 200 amp alternator to meet 75% of a 
vehicle’s needs.  Leading up to 200 amps, there are constant returns to 
scale.  Above 200 amps, there are also constant returns to scale; however 
the rate of return decreases, as there is less percent satisfaction of the goal 
to be gained per additional amp. 
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Figure 24. Value vs. Alternator size 
 
 c. Survivability 
 The third top tier goal, survivability, encompasses vehicle force 
protection, safety, payload, and sustainability.  These distinct sub-objectives represent a 
vehicle’s safety and payload. 
 Force protection describes the ability of a vehicle to survive an attack.  
“Conducting irregular warfare against an unconventional enemy on a battlefield without 
front lines and secure areas requires an emphasis on protection for the light tactical 
vehicle fleet supporting maneuver forces.”88  “Protected light tactical mobility protects… 
personnel from the effects of kinetic, non-kinetic, chemical, biological, nuclear, 
explosives, projectiles, and directed energy weapons.”89  This is very important in the 
realm of operational use, as it ensures the “ability to operate and survive within the threat 
                                                 
88 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), Force Application Appendix 1. 
89 Ibid, 5. 
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environment, providing mission assurance and continuity of operations.”90  This model 
represents all attack types together, to avoid any possible redundancies that may occur by 
double-counting the same protection measures, such as armor, that protect against several 
attack types. 
 Force protection is measured in levels of 1 to 4, corresponding to different 
levels of an attack that a vehicle may survive.  A vehicle’s level is not 
classified, but what type and intensity of attack the level corresponds to is.  
This corresponds to the system used to rate protection in the JLTV CDD; 
however due to difficulties obtaining the data, this attribute is not included 
in the final model used here.  The attribute is too important to be removed 
from the model as a whole, and should data become available, it should be 
reinstated.  The SDVF shows increasing returns to scale, as it grows more 
important to be able to withstand an attack as the size of the attack 
increases. 
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Figure 25. Value vs. Force protection 
 
 Safety measures the protection a vehicle offers its inhabitants in both a 
battle and non-battle context, broken down into two parts, avoiding and surviving 
accidents.  Several factors contribute to accidents, including “top heavy armored vehicles,  
                                                 
90 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), Force Application Appendix 1. 
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poor road conditions, inexperienced drivers, high speed, poor visibility, chaotic civilian 
drivers and a high threat environment.”91  Equipping vehicles with the means to avoid 
and survive potential crashes is critical. 
 Crash survival is measured by percent rollover, which is the percent of its 
own GVW that a vehicle’s roof can support.  The goal is to “provide a 
crashworthy vehicle structure capable of maintaining structural integrity in 
a rollover” by quantifying the crush resilience of the roof structure.92  
“Rollover protection is required in both training and operational settings, 
[as] vehicle accidents / mishaps, caused by non-hostile or hostile action, 
significantly contribute to loss of combat power.”93  Additionally, “IEDs 
and other threat attacks are causing secondary rollovers after 
detonation.”94  The SDVF for crash survival shows constant returns to 
scale.  It may seem that vehicles unable to support their own weight, or 
have a percent rollover of less than 100% should not give constant returns 
to scale; this is accounted for in the range that this function spans over.  
The minimum value of 0 is awarded to a vehicle which can support 100% 
GVW.  The data for this measure shows that all vehicles are capable of 
scoring a 10 in this objective, with no variation, justifying its exclusion 
from the final model. 
                                                 
91 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 24. 
92 Ibid, 24. 
93 Ibid, 24. 
94 Ibid, 24. 
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Figure 26. Value vs. Crash survival 
 
 Crash avoidance is measured by the % go (100% minus % no go) on the 
NATO Reference Mobility Model, for dry normal conditions in Al 
Mafrag, Jordan.  The NRMM makes predictions “using terrain 
characteristics (e.g., soil strength, vegetation, slope, roughness), vehicle 
attributes (e.g., tractive effort curve, weight, aerodynamic properties, 
dimensions), and scenario parameters (e.g., dry, wet, snow, sand).”95  For 
example, “traction, ride quality, and visibility” may limit vehicle speed.96  
This location and conditions were chosen to represent the current 
operational demands on the TWV fleet.  Vehicles are judged based on 
“performance speeds, soft-soil mobility, and trafficability.”97  This scale 
represents the ability of a vehicle to maneuver, which is a proxy for safety 
in that a more maneuverable vehicle is more likely to avoid accidents.  
The SDVF for crash avoidance shows constant returns to scale, as each 
successive increase in safety is weighted equally. 
                                                 
95 U.S. Army Modeling and Simulation Resource Repository (MSSR).  “NATO Reference Mobility 
Model.”; available from http://www.msrr.army.mil/index.cfm?RID=MNS_A_1000379; INTERNET. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 21. 
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Figure 27. Value vs. Crash avoidance 
 
 The payload of a vehicle measures its carrying ability, in passengers, 
weight, volume, and towing.  Payload might be better applied under a separate main 
objective, perhaps called “Utility”.  However, in this model it is located under the 
survivability objective because of sponsor preference.  Updating this in the VM is one 
possibility for further research.   
 “Current operations highlight the need for increased payload in the light 
tactical fleet.  Maneuver units need this payload in order to carry and employ the 
weapons and combat enablers required on the modern battlefield.”98  “A critical need 
exists for a high mobility, multi-capable LTWV capable of transporting greater payloads 
and for providing… protected troop transport.”99  To this end, it is beneficial to have 
more of each of the above abilities; however, there is often a tradeoff between payload 
and other attributes.  “Although protection is the highest priority, it can not take away 
from the payload required” of the vehicle.100  Payload encompasses two sub-objectives, 
capacity and towing.  Capacity refers to a vehicle’s internal carrying ability, including 
maximum weight, cargo area, and number of seats, while towing refers to a vehicle’s 
external carrying ability and includes maximum towing weight. 
                                                 
98 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), Force Application Appendix 1. 
99 Ibid, 25. 
100 Ibid, Force Application Appendix 1. 
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 Maximum weight is defined to include “occupants and their personal 
equipment with individual weapon, sustainment items, [and] mission 
essential equipment.”101  These elements will factor into the next two 
attributes, cargo area and number of seats; however each attribute limits 
the capability differently and thus need to be accounted for.  The SDVF 
for maximum weight has decreasing returns to scale, justified by the fact 
that space is more commonly the limiting factor than weight; decreasing 
the marginal value of higher successive pounds. 
















Figure 28. Value vs. Maximum weight 
 
 Cargo area refers to the space available for cargo, exclusive of passengers.  
Inherently, there is thus a tradeoff between cargo area and number of 
seats, as well as cargo area and any additional equipment a vehicle may 
carry.  The SDVF for cargo area has increasing returns to scale, reflecting 
its increasing importance as it often is limiting factor in carrying capacity. 
                                                 
101 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 25. 
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Figure 29. Value vs. Cargo area 
 
 The number of seats available in the vehicle includes the seats allotted for 
the driver, gunner, operators (e.g.  medics in an ambulance), passengers 
(e.g.  squad transport) and litter patients.  The attribute could alternatively 
measure whether a vehicle had enough seats for its mission role, but that 
would not reflect the seats as a space allotment.  The SDVF is linear to 
show the equal importance given to each seat. 
















Figure 30. Value vs. Number of seats 
 
 Towing is an important capability for a vehicle, allowing for additional 
material to be carried, external of the space constraints of the vehicle, and increasing the 
effective payload capability.  Towed material can include howitzers, trailers, or, with a 
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standard Army 5-ton wrecker tow bar, a like vehicle.102  Towing capacity can be 
measured either by weight, or, if it is a like vehicle being towed, distance.  This model 
focuses on towing supplies, and therefore measures ability by weight. 
 Towing capacity includes payload of any towed material, as well as the 
tongue and pintle, and is measured in pounds.  Its SDVF is linear, as each 
additional pound gives the same amount of value and is not subject to 
other limitations such as space. 
















Figure 31. Value vs. Towing capacity 
 
 The sustainability of a vehicle contributes towards survivability by 
ensuring that vehicles are reliable, affordable, and low-maintenance.  Vehicles have 
become a crucial element to today’s operations, and achieving the three aspects of 
sustainability assures that the fleet is not limited by accessibility to operational vehicles. 
 “Reliability is the probability that [a vehicle] will perform its intended 
mission functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time or 
distance.”103  It is measured in Mean Miles Between Operational Mission 
Failure (MMBOMF), defined as “a critical failure event rendering a 
system incapable of continuing its mission, deadlining the system, and 
                                                 
102 U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization.  
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV).  (Fort Eustis, VA: GPO, 2004), 27 
103 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 26. 
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requiring immediate (maintenance) attention to return the system to an 
operational condition.”104  Currently, prolonged operations need to 
operate at extended ranges, and the changing global environment makes it 
critical for vehicles to have a high level of reliability.105  The SDVF for 
reliability shows increasing returns to scale, with the increased value 


















Figure 32. Value vs. Reliability 
 
 Total ownership measures the cost of a vehicle over its lifetime, in FY08$, 
including procurement and Operations & Support (O&S) costs.  
Procurement costs refer to all “cost elements such as nonrecurring 
production, recurring production, data, training, system 
engineering/program management, etc,” and do not include RDTE 
costs.106  O&S costs refer to all costs accrued over a vehicle’s assumed 20 
year useful life, and “comprise a major portion of the overall life cycle 
cost and the cost of maintaining and supporting the current TWV fleet.”107  
It therefore is important to minimize the “cost of maintaining and 
                                                 
104 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 26. 
105 Ibid, 26. 
106 Ibid, 62-64. 
107 Ibid, 26. 
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supporting the family of vehicles…to free up resources for other critical 
war fighting requirements.”108  Total ownership has decreasing returns to 
scale, focusing on cutting the cost of less expensive and more common 
vehicles. 
















Figure 33. Value vs. Total ownership 
 
 The amount of maintenance a vehicle requires affects the lifetime cost and 
availability of a vehicle.  Lifetime cost is accounted for above; this attribute focuses on 
operational availability.  Operational availability affects a vehicle’s ability to “maximize 
available combat power, minimize maintenance force structure, and minimize exposure 
and dispersion requirements for crews and maintenance personnel.”109 
 Operational availability is the percent of time a vehicle is operational, 
defined as “up time / total time.”110  Its increasing returns to scale reflect 
the increased gain as vehicles require less cost and effort to maintain. 
                                                 
108 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007), 25-26. 
109 U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization.  
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV).  (Fort Eustis, VA: GPO, 2004), 24. 
110 Joint Requirements Oversight Council.  Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Joint 


















Figure 34. Value vs. Availability 
 
2. Swing Weight Matrix 
The last part of the model assessment was the weights.  Following the swing 
weight matrix method, attributes were placed in a matrix according to their variability 
and essentiality, in terms of controllability.  “Variability” here is not used in the statistical 
sense; instead refers to the amount of value gained from swinging an attribute from its 
worst to best value.  “In terms of controllability” refers to whether an attribute can be 
planned around.  In combat, if a vehicle must rely on an attribute, having not been able to 
make prior arrangements, this attribute is “important.”  For example, number of seats 
would receive a low essentiality matrix weight, as number of seats is known and can be 
accounted for by only assigning appropriate vehicles to missions that require a lot of 
seats.  Force protection would receive a high essentiality matrix weight, as a vehicle 
cannot control for an attack; the most it can do is prepare for it.  Matrix swing weights 
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Figure 35. Swing weight matrix 
 
This matrix includes all measures from the complete model, including those not in 
the final model.  Measures excluded from the final model are indicated in brackets, and 
are not included in further calculations.  From here, each attribute was assigned a global 
weight by normalizing over each of the matrix swing weights assigned above, and rolled 
up to the main objectives.  Mobility received a weight of 0.459, net-ready 0.066, and 
survivability 0.476.  The details of the weights can be found in Appendix B. 
B. RESULTS 
The VM assigns the following values to vehicles, on a scale of 1 to 10.  The 
“Ideal” vehicle achieved a 10 in every attribute, and serves as a source of comparison.  
Vehicle values can be interpreted as the “proportion of the distance, in a value sense, the 
alternative is from the (possibly hypothetical) alternative with an overall value of zero to 
the (also possibly hypothetical) alternative with an overall value of 10.”111 
                                                 




   
   
   









   
   
   
   





The values below reflect, as expected, that the JLTV shows significant 
improvement over the HMMWV in all objectives.  Both the average values and the 
percent of the ideal vehicle achieved show this.  This observation is reassuring, as it 
proves the LTWV fleet is moving in a direction of improving operational ability.  By 
addressing capability gaps observed with HMMWVs, the JLTV has earned higher values. 
 
  Total Mobility Net-ready Survivability 
IDEAL 10.000 4.585 0.655 4.760 
HMMWV 4.471 2.377 0.373 1.720 
% Ideal 44.71% 51.84% 57.02% 36.14% 
JLTV 6.499 3.541 0.655 2.303 
% Ideal 64.99% 77.23% 100.00% 48.39% 
 
Table 3.   Comparison of HMMWV and JLTV scores, by objective 
 
1. Mission Variant Comparison 
Observations can be made by comparing the different mission variants of the 
LTWV fleet, armament, reconnaissance, and utility vehicles.  Both HMMWVs and 
JLTVs can be divided into these categories.  A vehicle’s mission affects its attributes, and 
its design reflects its combat role.  For example, an armament vehicle may have more 
armor and less cargo area than a utility vehicle.  The results are broken down by mission 
role below, and complete results may be found in the Appendix C. 
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 a. Armament Vehicles 
 Armament vehicles are primarily light fighting vehicles.  The CTV will be 
a lighter vehicle to increase its mobility.  Each armament vehicle and its values are shown 


















Figure 36. Armament vehicle values broken down by objective 
 
 Total Mobility Net-ready Survivability 
IDEAL 10.000 4.412 0.630 4.958 
M1025 3.499 2.195 0.000 1.304 
M1025A1 3.597 2.277 0.000 1.320 
M1025A2 3.655 1.808 0.135 1.712 
M1026 5.230 2.760 0.473 1.998 
M1026A1 5.312 2.842 0.473 1.998 
M1069 5.206 2.867 0.473 1.867 
M966 4.774 2.762 0.000 2.012 
M966A1 4.869 2.849 0.000 2.020 
CTV2A 6.248 3.664 0.630 1.954 
CTV3A 6.220 3.664 0.630 1.926 
UVH1 6.856 3.127 0.630 3.098 
Average 5.043 2.801 0.313 1.928 
 
Table 4.   Armament vehicle scores, by objective 
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 b. Reconnaissance Vehicles 
 Reconnaissance vehicles are designed for battlespace awareness, and 
emphasize net-readiness.  It is important to note that this category of mission variant has 
a higher proportion of JLTVs to HMMWVs than other categories, perhaps skewing the 


















Figure 37. Reconnaissance vehicle values, broken down by objective 
 
 Total Mobility Net-ready Survivability 
IDEAL 10.000 4.412 0.630 4.958 
M1114 3.410 0.952 0.473 1.985 
LRS1A 6.839 3.808 0.630 2.401 
LRS2A 6.839 3.808 0.630 2.401 
CTV1A 6.304 3.664 0.630 2.010 
CTV5A 6.248 3.664 0.630 1.954 
Average 5.928 3.179 0.599 2.150 
 
Table 5.   Reconnaissance scores, by objective 
 
 c. Utility Vehicles 
 Utility vehicles are intended for moving both people and cargo, and are 
designed with mobility and high payload capacity in mind.  In this model, a payload 

































































Figure 38. Utility vehicle values, broken down by objective 
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 Total Mobility Net-ready Survivability 
IDEAL 10.000 4.412 0.630 4.958 
M996 5.094 2.701 0.473 1.920 
M996A1 5.180 2.788 0.473 1.920 
M997 4.409 2.159 0.473 1.778 
M997A1 4.406 2.156 0.473 1.778 
M997A2 4.222 1.736 0.473 2.013 
M998 4.619 2.776 0.000 1.843 
M998A1 4.622 2.779 0.000 1.843 
M1035 5.366 2.784 0.473 2.110 
M1035A2 5.443 2.383 0.473 2.587 
M1037 5.034 2.221 0.473 2.340 
M1038 5.535 2.781 0.473 2.281 
M1038A1 5.620 2.867 0.473 2.281 
M1042 5.020 2.180 0.473 2.367 
M1043 4.022 1.599 0.473 1.950 
M1044 3.970 1.597 0.473 1.901 
M1097 5.153 2.193 0.473 2.488 
M1097A1 5.153 2.193 0.473 2.488 
M1097A2 4.760 1.800 0.473 2.488 
M1113 3.847 1.030 0.473 2.344 
CTV4 6.220 3.664 0.630 1.926 
CTV6 6.164 3.664 0.630 1.870 
CTV7 6.192 3.664 0.630 1.898 
UVL1 7.123 3.182 0.630 3.311 
UVL2 7.095 3.182 0.630 3.283 
UVL3 7.095 3.182 0.630 3.283 
UVL4 7.095 3.182 0.630 3.283 
UVH2 6.828 3.127 0.630 3.070 
UVH3 6.828 3.127 0.630 3.070 
UVH4 6.828 3.127 0.630 3.070 
GMV1 6.343 2.830 0.630 2.883 
Average 5.510 2.622 0.499 2.389 
 
Table 6.   Utility vehicle scores, by objective 
 
d. Comparison 
  The strengths of each mission variant are compared using the average 
percent of ideal.  It is difficult to compare achievement across objectives and vehicles 
with the weighting system, as the highest value possible varies.  Taking the percentage of 
ideal normalizes to account for this.  Average percent ideal is the amount that the average 
value of a mission variant objective achieves of its ideal value.  It can be thought of as a 
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proportion of ideality that a mission variant achieves, per objective.  Looking at Table 7, 
the LRS receives the highest value the highest overall, by a slight margin.  The high ratio 
of JLTVs to HMMWVs may have an affect, as JLTVs as a whole receive higher values.  
As expected, within each objective, each variant receives the highest value in its main 
mission role.  The armament vehicles do the best in mobility, reconnaissance vehicles in 
net-readiness, and the utility vehicles in survivability.   
 Total Mobility Net-ready Survivability 
IDEAL 100.00% 44.12% 6.30% 49.58% 
Armament 53.16% 69.52% 63.10% 37.34% 
Reconnaissance 56.96% 64.74% 91.67% 45.63% 
Utility Vehicle 54.84% 57.30% 77.68% 49.75% 
 
Table 7.   Average percent ideal 
 
The results of this analysis will provide input data for the LTWV LP.  
Each vehicle contributes a certain amount of each objective to the overall fleet, giving the 
LTWV LP a way to measure the fleet as a whole. 
 
C. THE LTWV LINEAR PROGRAM FORMULATION 
1. Objective Function 
The LTWV model is a LP which prescribes recaps, retirements, and new 
purchases for the U.S. Army LTWV fleet for the next 15 years.  Through elastic 
constraints, the LTWV LP models operational requirements, budget, capacity and age.  
Elastic constraints can be violated at a penalty set by the decision maker.  These 
requirements ensure that the fleet maintains readiness throughout the modernization 
process, while staying within budget.  The objective function of the LTWV LP is the 
minimization of the sum of the penalties incurred by violating constraints.  This forces 
the model to search for a feasible modernization strategy.  Modernization strategies will 
be a combination of recaps, new purchases, and retirements for the vehicle variants, 
spread over the 15 year timeframe. 
 Elastic constraints offer advantages over traditional fixed constraints.  The use of 
elastic constraints results in a flexible feasible region, enabling the decision maker to 
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identify and manipulate violated constraints.  Control over the associated penalties may 
offer insight to the decision maker on which constraints are most important to meet.  This 
provides the Army with invaluable insight on what the best decision choices will be in 
the future as the LTWV fleet modernization is underway. 
2. Constraints 
The Army requires that the LTWV fleet be operationally capable at all times.  
Operational capability is measured in units of value, and uses the results of the VM.  
Overall fleet value in mobility, net-readiness, and survivability must be maintained.  The 
LTWV LP models fleet capability value as the sum of individual vehicle capability 
values.  Operational requirement constraints ensure the fleet has a diverse range of 
capabilities at all times.  When vehicles retire or go to the depot for recapping, they are 
not operationally available, limiting the number that may be out of service at once.  
Constraints in the LTWV LP capture the maintenance downtime associated with 
recapping a vehicle. 
Capacity constraints govern how many vehicles can undergo recapping at once.  
There are maximum capacity constraints that control the number of vehicles receiving 
maintenance at any given time.  Each depot has a maximum capacity of vehicles it can 
process per year, limiting the number of recaps the fleet can have in progress at any given 
time. 
There are also capacities associated with purchasing and retiring vehicles.  The 
amount of new vehicles which can be produced each year from suppliers determines the 
upper limit on the number of purchases that can be made.  The JLTV CDD also offers 
some insight as to when JLTVs are scheduled to be introduced into the fleet.  This 
timeline as well as procurement numbers offer an upper and lower bound on how many 
new JLTVs can be procured per year.  The upper limit on retiring vehicles expresses a 
limit on how many of each type of vehicle may be retired each year, to control fleet 
turnover.  Currently, the Army has no official policy on the maximum number of vehicles 
that can be retired every year.  The present solution is to continue fixing vehicles until 
they are no longer serviceable, and only then retire them.  However, with the 
procurement of every new JLTV, a subsequent retiring of a HMMWV of the same 
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mission will be permitted at one-to-one rate.  So although there is no current upper bound 
on the number of vehicles that can be retired, the actual number should be dictated by the 
arrival of the JLTV replacements. 
The overall fleet age must be between the minimum and maximum desired fleet 
age, as designated by TACOM.  Overall age varies throughout the modernization 
process, and is an average of the age of all vehicles operational at the time.  This does not 
include vehicles undergoing recaps. 
The Army has a finite budget each year to devote to the LTWV modernization.  
Over each year, the budget must be adhered to, and cover all operations and 
modernization.  More specifically, this refers to all operating costs associated with the 
current fleet, as well as all of the costs incurred from recaps, retirements, and new 
purchases during the time period.  In the LTWV LP the budget is a hardwired constraint.  
However, since the budget for this project has yet to be determined past the six year 
point, if possible, the budget constraints should be modified in order to better reflect 
changing budget allocations.  Also, because the budget is an elastic constraint, decision 
makers will be able to better judge future budget needs in order to maintain operational 
requirements while replacing the HMMWVs with JLTVs.  For the complete formulation 
of the LTWV LP see Appendix D. 
Once the model is optimized, the output states the fleet composition, per vehicle 
variant.  The sum-product of the fleet inventory and the value assigned to each variant 
from the VM gives an overall fleet value.  The LTWV LP maximizes that overall fleet 
value at the end of the 15 year point, given the constraints provided.  The overall fleet 
value changes depending on the constraints, thus affording TACOM the ability to shift 
constraints and see how that affects the fleet composition as well as its value. 
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The LTWV Optimization Model uses data from a myriad of publications and area 
experts.  Professor Dell developed the LTWV LP and implemented it in GAMS.  We ran 
the VM to obtain the objective coefficients for the LTWV LP, collected, formatted, and 
quality controlled the data, and analyzed the results of the LTWV LP.   
Most of the data sets are modularized and created for LTWV LP to read-in. This 
allows for easy addition of data if more becomes available; or if the decision maker 
wishes to manipulate data to observe outcomes.  We programmed some parameters 
directly into the LTWV LP, but they are easily manipulated within the GAMS 
implementation.  The objective function of the LTWV LP comes directly from the results 
of the VM, as was the data for the constraints pertaining to the three main capabilities, 
mobility, net-ready, and survivability.  The objective function coefficients as well as the 
capabilities coefficients are written in separate files, from which the LTWV LP reads-in 
the data. 
We enhanced the LTWV LP to better simulate the JLTV replacement of the 
HMMWV:  Each HMMWV and JLTV was classified by the mission that they are 
designed to perform.  Those missions are: 
• Reconnaissance 
• Light Armament 
• Heavy Armament 
• Light Utility 
• Heavy Utility 
• Light Ambulance 
• Heavy Ambulance 
• Light Shelter 
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• Heavy Shelter 
• Prime Mover 
• Command and Control (C2).   
In the LTWV LP, we added a caveat such that a newly procured JLTV should 
replace a HMMWV with a matching mission role.  The underlying motivation is to 
maintain the fleet operational capability.  For example, we designed this constraint to 
prevent Light Ambulance JLTVs replacing Heavy Armament HMMWVs. 
We categorize the initial LTWV fleet inventory by variant and age.  This allows 
the program to try to minimize the average age of the fleet as well as indicate which 
vehicles to retire once they were too old.  It also provides a base case computation of the 
overall fleet value, calculated as the product of the value of any given vehicle variant and 
the number of vehicles of that type in the current LTWV fleet.  The sum of all the variant 
values yields the overall fleet value. 
As is always the case in analytical undertakings, we make assumptions when data 
for the constraints either did not exist or were otherwise unobtainable.  We specify these 
assumptions below. 
1. Assumptions 
Our first assumption is putting upper-bounds on the age an individual vehicle or 
the average age of the fleet before forcing individual vehicles to retire.  The Army 
currently practices the method of only retiring vehicles if they are no longer serviceable, 
regardless of age.  However, with the upcoming integration of the JLTV, HMMWV 
vehicles that are still serviceable will be retired to save on O&S costs.  Initially, we set 
the maximum age of any given HMMWV or the average fleet age to 25 years.  We 
increased the age to 35 years because when the program ran, HMMWVs were being 
forced to retire before the JLTVs could replace them. 
A facet of the program we did not utilize was modeling the time it took to recap a 
vehicle.  Professor Dell designed the program to accept a decimal value between 0 and 1, 
representing the fraction of a year a vehicle is available after being recapped.  Upon 
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inquiry, we found that the depot facilities are currently overflowing with vehicles needing 
maintenance.  No data has been collected on the average time it takes to recap a 
HMMWV.  Therefore we set that that value to 0, stating that it took exactly 1 year to 
recap a vehicle.   
We make approximations for the cost associated with recapping a vehicle.  We 
searched for the costs associated with recapping each vehicle variant the recap program 
applies to.  We only found data on the average recap costs per recap depot (Red River 
Army Depot (RRAD), and Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD).  The average recap cost 
applied to every vehicle undergoing a recap is $50,960.  Decision makers can easily 
incorporate data on the cost to recap individual variants, if it becomes available. 
We also assume the values for the overall budget.  Ideally the program’s overall 
budget would consist of the sum of the budgets allotted for: 
• New HMMWV procurement 
• The HMMWV Recapitalization program 
• New JLTV procurement 
• Operating costs for both HMMWVs and JLTVs.   
We would list these budgets per year, extending to Fiscal Year 2022 (FY22) (the 
15 year point where we end the model).  However, much of this data is unavailable.  
Although we found budgets for the HMMWV procurement and the Recapitalization 
program for FY07, there was no published information on how that budget is going to 
shift in the next 15 years.  Also, the JLTV is still in its concept design phase so only 
estimations exist for the JLTV procurement budget and no information at all exists on 
their projected operating costs.  Therefore, we used one number for all 15 years of 
budgets.  This number, 15.8 Billion FY08$, is the projected budget for the JLTV program 
as stated in the JLTV CDD.  As the years pass and budgets are published for these 
programs, decision makers can easily update the budgets. 
The last critical assumption we make concerns the lower and upper bounds for the 
procurement numbers for both the HMMWV and the JLTV.  In other words, the bounds 
on the number of vehicles the Army is allowed to purchase.  There are separate boundary 
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values for each variant over the 15 year modeling time frame.  Although these values are 
assumptions, we base them upon estimations and averages computed from actual data. 
First, we will discuss the lower and upper bounds for the HMMWV procurement.  
The lower bound for each of the HMMWV vehicles for each year is 0, stating that the 
Army is not required to procure any HMMWVs in any given year.  HMMWV 
procurement estimates vary significantly among the experts, some as high as 4,000 units 
annually.  In some cases, these estimates are greater than the upper-bounds we use, and 
would therefore make the LTWV LP infeasible.  Consequently, we selected a lower 
bound procurement number of 0.  Decision makers can easily increase the lower bound, if 
they wish.  
We were only able to gather data for the upper-bound of the planned number of 
HMMWV procurements through the year 2013.  The data came listed as an aggregated 
form per year, not broken down by HMMWV variant.  We converted this data into a 
usable form by distributing total procurement numbers evenly over every HMMWV 
variant still in production.  From the year 2013 on, we assume that the HMMWV will no 
longer be in production, as the Army plans on procuring the first batch of JLTVs in the 
year 2012. 
The JLTV CDD contains procurement timelines and planned quantities for the 
JLTV.  The Army plans on implementing Increment I, the first procurement of JLTVs, in 
2012, with a production of 5,500 vehicles.  In 2016, the second phase of production, 
Increment II, will begin.  This includes 3,986 LRS vehicles, 15,794 CTV vehicles and 
13,494 vehicles, totaling to 33,274 JLTV vehicles.   
We divided Increment I procurement data over a four year period – from 2012-
2015 – and evenly over every JLTV variant.  We divided Increment II data over a three 
year period – from 2016-2018 – and over each JLTV variant.  The distribution simulates 
procurements over several years to take into account maximum plant production 
capabilities as well as budget capabilities. 
The JLTV procurement numbers, ranging from 2012 to 2018, serve both as lower 
and upper bounds in the LTWV LP.  We implement this equality to force the shift in the 
LTWV fleet from HMMWVs to JLTVs.  Before 2012, we set the upper bound for the 
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JLTV to 0 because JLTVs will not yet be eligible for production.  After 2018, the lower 
bound per year on the JLTV is 0, with no upper bound.  We did this to simulate the 
JLTVs heavy production and to meet the goal of completely retiring the HMMWV. 
Every assumption we make is either based upon real data or notional data drafted 
from area experts and official publications.  The LTWV LP presents the data in such a 
way that notional data is easily updatable with more accurate data.  Insights from the 
model can still be drawn even though some notional data drives it. 
B. ANALYSIS 
The Linear Program’s beta test included six runs.  Each run, we varied the inputs 
slightly, and analyzed the results.   We performed a simple sensitivity analysis on the 
overall allotted budget, the allowed maximum HMMWV age, and delays in the JLTV 
procurement schedule.  We considered our base case to be a 15.8 Billion FY08$ budget, a 
maximum HMMWV age of 35 years, and an on time JLTV procurement. 
1. Fleet Value Comparison 
Each year, the LTWV fleet will have a new fleet value based upon the value the 
VM assigns to each vehicle variant and the fleet’s current inventory.  Implementing 
recap, buy new and retirement options on each vehicle, the fleet’s composition changes 
year to year.  We ran an analysis to investigate the effect that the modernization process 
has on the overall fleet value.  It is important to note that the LTWV LP aims to 
maximize the overall fleet value.  The fleet value is computed in Year 1, and set as a 
lower bound on subsequent years. This ensures the fleet maintains at least its current 
value and operational readiness.  A higher optimal solution might exist if we allow the 
fleet values to dip below the value of the first year.  However, the repercussions of not 
having ready vehicles to use adversely impacts combat readiness.  The current fleet value 
for year one of the fifteen year program is 328,495.  Below are the fleet values over the 
15 year analyzing period for three separate budgets. 
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The first graph is for the 15.8 Billion FY08$ per year budget.  This budget is the 
base case. 














































Figure 39. Fleet Values for a 15.8 Billion FY08$ Budget 
 
Note the steep increase in the fleet value in 2016.  The implementation of the Increment 
II, the start of a procurement of approximately 33,000 JLTVs, accounts for this increase.  
This also shows that the JLTV, in theory, will be a much more capable vehicle than the 
HMMWV.  The highest fleet value is reached in 2022 with a value of 460,730.  The 
average fleet value of the 15 year period is 364,116. 
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The second graph is the same analyzing except the budget was restricted to 10.8 
Billion FY08$ per year. 















































Figure 40. Fleet Values for a 10.8 Billion FY08$ Budget 
 
Notice that in comparison to the $15.8 Billion budget, these fleet values are significantly 
lower.  The maximum fleet value for this iteration is only 455,677 and the average is 
354,183.  This average is 9,933 less than the average fleet value given a $15.8 Billion 
budget.  These dips in the fleet value indicate to decision makers that the budget should 
not be lowered if they want to maximize overall fleet effectiveness. 
78 
The third graph observes the fleet value with an increased budget of 20.8 FY08$ 
Billion per year. 














































Figure 41. Fleet Values for a 20.8 Billion FY08$ Budget 
 
The fleet values do not increase as the budget increases from $15.8 Billion to 
$20.8 Billion.  At $20.8 Billion, the maximum fleet value stays steady at 460,730 with an 
average fleet value of 364,116.  The rapid drop off of returns to scale as the budget 
increases indicates that the limiting factor bounding fleet value is not its available funds.  
Therefore, there would be no benefit to increasing the budget.  The factor limiting the 
fleet value must be another constraint.  Investigating within our model, we found that the 
procurement rate is bounding fleet value growth.  That is, we specify exactly how many 
JLTVs to procure each year.  A more interesting result from increasing the budget might 
exist if a decision maker changed that assumption. 
2. Delayed Procurement Analysis 
A second analysis ran was simulating a delay in the procurement timeline.  This 
analysis illustrates the possible drawbacks if the integration of the JLTV is delayed.  The 
base case of a 35 year maximum allowable age of any vehicle and a $15.8 Billion budget 
was compared to an identical case save year that the JLTV integration began.  Instead of 
the planned 5,500 unit procurement beginning in 2012 and the 33,000 unit procurement  
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beginning in 2016, the 5,500 unit procurement was pushed back to begin in 2014 and the 
33,000 unit procurement to begin in 2018.  Figure 42 is a graphical comparison of the 
base case vs. the delayed production. 





















































Figure 42. On time procurement vs. delayed procurement 
 
It becomes apparent that a delay in the procurement of the JLTV vehicles causes 
the fleet value to suffer considerably.  In fact, the fleet value for the delayed procurement 
dips below the original fleet value of 328,495 in a total of eight of the 15 years that the 
program is operated.  This number represents the overall operational capability of the 
LTWV fleet, with the goal of the JLTV program to raise that operational capability, not 
lower it.  It is suspected that the cause of this sharp decrease in the fleet value is due to a 
sudden forced retirement of many HMMWV vehicles.  The HMMWV fleet ages too 
much before the JLTV can be implemented to replace them.  Failure to implement the 
JLTV program on time without creating viable alternatives to further extend the lifespan 
of the HMMWV fleet could lead to disastrous consequences for the LTWV fleet and its 
operational capabilities. 
3. Recommendations 
From the cursory analysis that we ran using the LTWV LP we derive several 
insights concerning future modernization strategies.  According to our model, the 
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proposed budget of $15.8 Billion to cover the cost of procuring new JLTVs is acceptable.  
After testing the fleet values with a $5 Billion budget decrease, results showed a dramatic 
drop in the overall fleet values.  Alternatively, an increase of $5 Billion in the budget 
showed no increase in the overall fleet values.  The inability of the fleet to produce a 
higher average fleet value with additional funds indicates that the budget is not the 
limiting factor.  In fact, it may be possible to further lower the budget without affecting 
fleet value.  To increase the fleet value beyond that achieved with a $15.8 Billion budget, 
it is necessary to increase the upper bounds on procurement numbers. 
The analysis that was ran simulating a delay in the JLTV procurement also lead to 
interesting results.  With the delay, the overall fleet values dropped dramatically, 
sometimes below the initial fleet value.  That is to say that the operational effectiveness 
of the entire LTWV fleet will be diminished while waiting for the JLTVs to arrive.  Too 
many HMMWVs reached their maximum age and were forced to retire without any 
JLTVs to replace them.  
In conclusion, it would be wise for the Army to draft contingency plans for 
extending the life-span of the HMMWV fleet.  These plans could include preparing to 
create more recap depots, increasing the capacity of the Recapitalization program.  The 
Army could also expand the Recapitalization program to apply to more vehicle variants.  
The Army could continue to refuse to retire vehicles depending on their age, but rather 
solely based upon their operability until the JLTV can be released.  However, as 
described earlier, the HMMWV fleet is in dire need of relief.  The HMMWV is a 1980s 
technology which is being expected to serve in a war fighting role in the 21st century.  
Further delays in the JLTV program could lead to disastrous effects on the battle field 
and unnecessary loss of lives for American soldiers.  We gain a powerful insight on the 
importance of introducing the JLTV as scheduled and on time. 
There are many more analyses that can be run using the LTWV optimization 
model.  For instance, the model is capable of mapping the changes in the fleet 
composition every year.  It output would document how many and which variant LTWVs 
were recapped, retired and purchased.  We did not investigate these changes because 
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based upon our assumptions we already knew exactly how many JLTVs the Army 
procured every year.  Investigating when the LTWV LP forces HMMWVs to retire is a 
prime example of how versatile this decision tool is. 
 This model does not provide an infallible prediction on what the exact 
composition of the LTWV fleet will be in 15 years.  It does, however, provide invaluable 
insight on possible pitfalls that lie in modernization strategies.  The model is also very 
capable of expanding to become more accurate as notional data is replaced with concrete 
data.  Overall, the LTWV optimization model is already a capable decision tool for 
decision makers at TACOM, and has yet to reach its full potential. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH   
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicle fleet faces a period of transition.  The 
HMMWV is aging and deteriorating, approaching the point of unsuitability for 
operational use.  To meet increased operational demands, the Army will develop and 
introduce a new vehicle, the JLTV.  The JLTV will eventually replace the HMMWV as 
the Army’s new LTWV, but its integration presents challenges. The JLTV is still in the 
design phase so the vehicles will not be available for several more years.  Intelligent 
planning is required to manage the extension of the lifespan of the HMMWV fleet until 
the JLTV can be integrated. 
 The Army has developed programs to extend the lifecycle of the HMMWV fleet 
while the JLTV is being designed and implemented.  The current U.S. Army HMMWV 
lifecycle extension program is the Recapitalization Program.  “Recapping” upgrades a 
HMMWV to a new, more robust variant. Currently, the Recap Program only applies to 
older HMMWV variants that perform combat missions.  In to order optimally manage the 
Recap Program and the integration of the JLTV, decision makers must consider all 
aspects of the modernization process, from operational requirements to budgetary 
constraints. 
The U.S. Tank-Automotive and Armament Command (TACOM) requested a 
decision tool to aid in optimizing the sustainment of the HMMWV and the integration of 
the JLTV.  Our thesis serves as a conceptual framework for that decision tool.  The 
decision tool itself takes form as an LP which maximizes the value of the LTWV fleet per 
year for the next 15 years while meeting operational and budget constraints.  “Value” is 
measured by a MODA, the VM, in which each vehicle is measured by its achievement of 
competing operational objectives.  The operational objectives the VM addresses are 
mobility, net-readiness, and survivability.  The optimum fleet value is constrained every 
year by budget constraints, operational requirements, and replacement options. 
Our analysis demonstrates the power the decision tool possesses.  Our analysis 
uses a combination of real and notional data, and is not designed to make specific 
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recommendations for future decisions, but rather to demonstrate the tool’s versatility and 
evolutionary capabilities.  Any notional data we use is logical, and follows subject matter 
expert recommendations.  To this end, analytic results are generally, but not specifically, 
valid.  Care should be taken in using the results; we recommend further analysis before 
any of these recommendations are implemented as policy. 
Regardless of the accuracy of the data, we were still able to make interesting 
observations using the model.  Perhaps the most interesting observation we noted was 
when we imposed a delay in the implementation of the JLTV.  With just a two year delay 
in the JLTV procurement timeline our model showed potentially disastrous declines in 
the overall value of the LTWV fleet.  Should the JLTV be delayed, contingency plans 
such as an expanded Recap Program would to minimize the decreases in the fleet values.  
We based this observation upon notional data, however it is still gives real insight to 
potential repercussions. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are many ways to further develop this work.  While the decision tool is 
conceptually complete and operational, the model requires concrete data to strengthen it.  
There are several places where more detailed data would make the model considerably 
more accurate.   
The decision tool can extend to include more vehicles, should other options 
become available.  Should policy makers place a different value on objectives, the model 
can evolve to reflect this by re-assessing the SDVFs and weights in the VM.  The LTWV 
LP can evolve to incorporate any additional constraints that arise in the future. 
The uncertainty of budgets, operational tempo, and emerging technologies create 
a complex environment for the decision makers at TACOM.  This tool will facilitate 
planning and exploring potential courses of action for the coming years.  This conceptual 
framework and analysis will aid decision makers in better planning the future of the 
LTWV fleet. 
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APPENDIX A: JLTV SUB-CONFIGURATIONS 
Functional 
Concept 
Mission Role Mission Role 
Variant (MRV) 
Configurations Sub-Configurations:   
Description  and Assets Requirement  
Payload Category:  
Capacity 
Long Range Surveillance (LRS) (4 seats)  









General Purpose C2 Variant (4+Gunner)  
Increment II Assets: TBD 
Payload Category A  
Threshold:  on vehicle  
4500 lbs w/o B kit 
3500 lbs with B Kit 
On Trailer: 3400 lbs 
Objective: on vehicle 
4000 lbs w /B kit 
On Trailer: 4200 lbs 
Move Recon / 
Surveillance Team  
 
Reconnaissance (1+4) 
(Armored Scout: Knight/FIST/CBRNE) 
Increment I Assets: TBD 
Increment II Assets: TBD 
Heavy Guns Carrier (4+Gunner) 
(MP, Mounted Patrol; Convoy Escort)  
Increment I Assets: TBD 
Increment II Assets: TBD 
Move Weapons 




Anti-Tank Missile Carrier  (4 seats) 
(TOW ITAS)  
Increment I Assets: TBD 
Increment II Assets: TBD 
Infantry Carrier - Fire Team – USA CTV (2+5)  
(also 120mm Mortar prime mover) 
Increment I Assets: TBD 









Infantry Carrier - 
Light 
Infantry Carrier - Fire Team – USMC CTV (1+5) 
(also 120mm Mortar prime mover) 
Increment I Assets: TBD 
Payload Category B  
Threshold:  
Marine Corps CTV= 
4000lbs  
On Trailer: 4200 lbs 
Army CTV=4500 lbs 
On Trailer: 4200 lbs 
 
Objective:  
Marine Corps CTV= 
4326lbs  
On Trailer: 5600 lbs 
Army CTV=5000 lbs 





Mission Role Mission Role 
Variant (MRV) 
Configurations Sub-Configurations:   
Description  and Assets Requirement  
Payload Category:  
Capacity 
Increment II Assets: TBD 
Move Tactical C2 C2OTM   (4 seat) 
(Tactical Maneuver Brigade C2) 
Increment I Assets: TBD 




Ambulance - B  (3 crew + 2 litters or 4 ambulatory 
patients) 
Increment I Assets: TBD 
Increment II Assets: TBD 
Carry light cargo 
(non-shelter) 
Utility – B  (2 seat)  
Increment I Assets: TBD 




Ambulance – C  (3 Crew + 4 Litters or 6 ambulatory 
patients) 
Increment II Assets: TBD 
Carry light cargo 
(non-shelter) 
Utility – C  (2 seat) 




Carry light / 
standard shelters  
Cargo Carrier - 
Light 
Shelter Carrier – C  (2 Seat) 
(Standard shelters - Maintenance, Communications) 








Utility Vehicle – 
Light (UVL) 
Prime Mover - 
Light 
Prime Mover – C  (2 Seat) 
(105mm Howitzer, Q-36 Radar)  
Increment II Assets: TBD 
Payload Category C:  
Threshold: 5100 lbs 
On Trailer = 5600lbs 
Objective: 5500 lbs 
On Trailer = 10,000 lbs 
Protected Troop Transport  (2+9) 





Convoy Protection Platform (2+gunner fore and aft) 







Utility Vehicle – 
Heavy (UVH) 
Cargo Carrier - Ambulance/Treatment Vehicle – D: -Heavy Ambulance 
Payload Category D:  
Threshold: 6100 lbs 
On Trailer = TBD 
Objective: 6700 lbs 




Mission Role Mission Role 
Variant (MRV) 
Configurations Sub-Configurations:   
Description  and Assets Requirement  




and Heavy Treatment Vehicle (Ambulance crew of 3 
Medical Personnel /Treatment crew of 4 Medical 
Personnel) 
Increment II Assets: TBD  
Carry heavy cargo 
(non-shelter) 
Utility – D  (2 seat) 




Shelter Carrier – D  (2 seat) 
(Heavy Shelters - Data Interchange) 
Increment II Assets: TBD 
Move Fire Support Prime Mover - 
Heavy 
Prime Mover – D  (2 seat) 
(Light Howitzer Ammunition Carrier; LW155) 
Increment II Assets: TBD 
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APPENDIX B: ATTRIBUTE SWING WEIGHTS 
  Variability Essentiality Local weight Global weight 
Max cruising range 3 2 75 0.066 
Top MPH 3 3 100 0.087 
Max 5% speed 3 2 75 0.066 
Max % grade 2 2 45 0.039 
Fuel eff. 3 3 100 0.087 
Air 3 3 100 0.087 
Sea 3 1 30 0.026 
Alternator size 3 2 75 0.066 
Crash avoid 2 3 75 0.066 
Max wt 3 3 100 0.087 
Cargo area 3 2 75 0.066 
# seats 3 1 30 0.026 
Towing 2 1 15 0.013 
Reliability 2 3 75 0.066 
Total Own. 2 3 75 0.066 
Availability 3 3 100 0.087 
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APPENDIX C: COMPLETE VM RESULTS 
  Mobility Net-ready Survivability Total Value 
IDEAL 4.585 0.655 4.760 10.000 
M1025 2.281 0.000 0.962 3.243 
M1025A1 2.367 0.000 0.979 3.346 
M1025A2 1.879 0.140 1.387 3.406 
M1026 2.868 0.491 1.683 5.043 
M1026A1 2.954 0.491 1.683 5.128 
M1035 2.893 0.491 1.800 5.184 
M1035A2 2.477 0.491 2.295 5.264 
M1037 2.309 0.491 2.039 4.839 
M1038 2.890 0.491 1.978 5.359 
M1038A1 2.979 0.491 1.978 5.448 
M1042 2.265 0.491 2.068 4.824 
M1043 1.662 0.491 1.633 3.787 
M1044 1.660 0.491 1.582 3.733 
M1069 2.979 0.491 1.548 5.018 
M1097 2.279 0.491 2.192 4.962 
M1097A1 2.279 0.491 2.192 4.963 
M1097A2 1.871 0.491 2.192 4.554 
M1113 1.070 0.491 2.043 3.605 
M1114 0.990 0.491 1.670 3.151 
M966 2.871 0.000 1.698 4.568 
M966A1 2.961 0.000 1.707 4.667 
M996 2.807 0.491 1.603 4.901 
M996A1 2.897 0.491 1.603 4.991 
M997 2.244 0.491 1.454 4.190 
M997A1 2.241 0.491 1.454 4.186 
M997A2 1.804 0.491 1.699 3.995 
M998 2.885 0.000 1.522 4.407 
M998A1 2.889 0.000 1.522 4.411 
CTV1A 3.808 0.655 1.696 6.159 
CTV2A 3.808 0.655 1.638 6.101 
CTV3A 3.808 0.655 1.609 6.072 
CTV4A 3.808 0.655 1.609 6.072 
CTV5A 3.808 0.655 1.638 6.101 
CTV6A 3.808 0.655 1.551 6.014 
CTV7A 3.808 0.655 1.580 6.043 
LRS1A 3.957 0.655 2.103 6.715 
LRS2A 3.957 0.655 2.103 6.715 
UVL1 3.307 0.655 3.048 7.010 
UVL2 3.307 0.655 3.019 6.981 
UVL3 3.307 0.655 3.019 6.981 
UVL4 3.307 0.655 3.019 6.981 
UVH1 3.250 0.655 2.827 6.732 
UVH2 3.250 0.655 2.798 6.703 
UVH3 3.250 0.655 2.798 6.703 
UVH4 3.250 0.655 2.798 6.703 
GMV1 2.941 0.655 2.603 6.199 
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APPENDIX D: LTWV LP FORMULATION 
SUBSCRIPTS AND SETS [EXPECTED CARDINALITY] 
 
a A∈   set of age groups (years old) 25A⎡ ⎤≈⎣ ⎦  
c C∈   set of capabilities 6C⎡ ⎤≈⎣ ⎦  
r R∈   set of recap options 10R⎡ ⎤≈⎣ ⎦  
t T∈   set of planning years 15T⎡ ⎤≈⎣ ⎦  
v V∈   set of vehicle variants 20T⎡ ⎤≈⎣ ⎦  
avv AT′∈  set of vehicles v′  that can be obtained from vehicle v that is a 
years old 
vv AF′∈   set of vehicles v′  that can be converted into vehicle v 




vage   maximum age for vehicle v 
artv vaval ′   fraction of a year vehicle v is available in year t when it started out 
in year t as a vehicle v′ , a years old before having recap r  
, tvtvbuy buy  minimum and maximum purchases allowed for vehicle v in year t 
avii   initial inventory of vehicle v and age a  
, tvtvfage fage  minimum and maximum average age for vehicle v at the start of 
year t 
rtrcap   maximum recaps r allowed in year t 
actvmap   capability c offered by vehicle v and age a in year t  
94 
ctdem   demand for capability c in year t 
atvom  year t operating cost for vehicle v that is age a 
'artvvcap  cost to recap vehicle v, a years old into v′  using recap r in year t 
tvnew   cost to take delivery of vehicle v in year t 
tvold   cost to retire vehicle v in year t 
tbudget   budget available in year t 
tvretire   maximum retires allowed for vehicle v in year t 
VARIABLES  
 
artvvE ′  number of vehicle v, a years old to recap into v′  using recap r at 
the start of year t 
atvI   number of vehicle v, a years old at the start of year t 
tvP   number of vehicle v to purchase at the start of year t 
atvR   number of vehicle v, a years old to retire at the start of year t 
 
FORMULATION  
Objective function:  
Minimize ∑Penalties incurred for violating elastic constraints 
 









=++ ∑     1 , 1,a t v∀ ≤ >  
Balances the inventory over time, for all non-new vehicles 
, 1, ' ,
, , v
atv a r t v v t v
a r v AF
I E P′ −
′ ′∈
= +∑      0 , 1,a t v∀ = >  
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Balances the inventory over time, for all new and recapped vehicles 
atv avI ii=        , 0,a t v∀ =  





a v v AFT
E rcap
′ ∈
≤∑      ,r t∀  
Ensures number of vehicles undergoing recap is less than the 
maximum recap capacity for each time period and vehicle type 
tvatv
a
R retire≤∑       ,t v∀  
Ensures number of vehicles being retired is less than the maximum 
retirement capacity for each time period and vehicle type 
tv tvtv
buy P buy≤ ≤       ,t v∀  
Ensures number of vehicles purchased falls between the minimum 
requirement and maximum capacity for each time period and vehicle type 
' '
, , v
atv artv v artv v atvtv
a a r v AF a
fage I aval E a I
′∈
⎛ ⎞+ ≤⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑   ,t v∀  
Forces overall fleet inventory age to be older than the minimum for 
each time period and vehicle type 
' '
, , v
atv atv artv v artv vtv
a a a r v AF
a I fage I aval E
′∈
⎛ ⎞≤ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑   ,t v∀  
Forces overall fleet inventory age to be younger than the maximum 
for each time period and vehicle type 
0 ' '
, , , , v
actv atv ctv artv v artv v ct
a v a r v v AF
map I map aval E dem
′∈
+ ≥∑ ∑    ,c t∀  
Ensures demand for each capability is met by the current operational 
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fleet for each time period 
'
, , ,( , ) ,
atv atv artvv artvv tv tv tv atv t
a v a r v v AFT v a v
om I cap E new P old R budget′
′ ∈
+ + + ≤∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   t∀  
Ensures the modernization strategy does not exceed the budget for all 
time periods 




Minimize penalties for violating elastic constraints.   
 
≤  and ≥  signify elastic constraints.  These constraints can be violated but such violation 
has a penalty per unit violation.    
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